{ "id": "RL31059", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31059", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 100480, "date": "2001-07-24", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:22:20.382941", "title": "Biological Weapons: A Primer", "summary": "In the past decade, public and congressional concerns over biological weapons (BW), and\nbioterrorism in particular, have sharply increased. Though the use of living organisms (e.g. bacteria,\nviruses, fungi) to harm or kill humans, livestock, or plants has never occurred on a large scale, many\ngovernment officials are viewing a BW attack as a \"when, not if\" scenario. Some experts, however, \nquestion this assertion, noting that BW production and employment is significantly more difficult\nthan often portrayed, and that there are significant political down sides for any nation or group who\nwould employ them. There have been a number of calls from Congress, the GAO, and\ncongressionally--mandated commissions for a comprehensive integrated national threat assessment\nto be performed, so that perceived vulnerabilities alone do not drive government's response.\n The United States has both statutes and regulations that govern possession and use of dangerous\nbiological agents, though some have deemed these too loose to maintain effective control of these\nagents. Though no legislation has been introduced to date in the 107th Congress, legislation\nconsidered in the 106th Congress may be reintroduced later in the session.\n Federal programs intended to deter, respond to, and/or mitigate a BW attack exist in a broad\nrange of government departments and agencies, and have been subject to criticism for lack of\ncoordination. Vice-president Cheney is overseeing a review of all programs related to\nchemical/biological/radiological/nuclear threat response, and in October 2001 is expected to provide\nrecommendations, which would be implemented under the direction of the Federal Emergency\nManagement Agency.\n As a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States has participated in\na decade-long effort to negotiate a protocol to the Convention that would improve assurance of\ncompliance. It had been hoped that a draft protocol would be ready for consideration by the BWC\nReview Conference in November 2001, however significant remaining disagreements ( both between\nthe United States and its Western Group allies and with developing countries) over the effectiveness\nof verification measures, technology assistance, and protection of commercial proprietary\ninformation appear to have stalled this effort.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31059", "sha1": "8bcf151d473e2786657e4fe34c54712307db9706", "filename": "files/20010724_RL31059_8bcf151d473e2786657e4fe34c54712307db9706.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20010724_RL31059_8bcf151d473e2786657e4fe34c54712307db9706.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }