{
  "id": "RL31077",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31077",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101066,
      "date": "2001-08-09",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:21:53.441941",
      "title": "Private Actions to Sue for Civil Rights Violations in Federally Assisted Programs After Alexander v. Sandoval",
      "summary": "In  Alexander v. Sandoval , a narrow 5 to 4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court\n ruled that private\nindividuals may not sue state agencies under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act over claims of \nunintentional or so-called \"disparate impact\" discrimination. At issue in  Sandoval  was\nthe State of\nAlabama's \"English-only policy,\" requiring all aspects of its driver's license examination process,\nincluding the written portion, to be exclusively in English. In rejecting a Mexican immigrant's claim\nthat the state policy violated Title VI because of its \"disparate impact\" on ethnic minorities, a five\nJustice majority ruled that Congress did not intend a private right of action to enforce Title VI,\nexcept as a remedy for intentional discrimination. Federal regulations prohibiting state practices that\nhave a discriminatory impact, regardless of intent, could not provide a basis for private lawsuits. \n Sandoval , however, did not directly confront federal agency authority, previously\nacknowledged by\nthe Court, to enforce Title VI compliance administratively with rules condemning practices \ndiscriminatory in their effect on protected minority groups. Thus, at least for now, \"disparate impact\"\nrules -- like those mandating language assistance for non-English proficient clients of federally\nfinanced programs -- may still be enforced by the government, just not by private litigants. In\naddition, as Justice Stevens emphasized in his  Sandoval  dissent, an alternative avenue\nof relief for\nTitle VI disparate impact claims may be available under another civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.\nSection 1983. But given the lengths to which the Court went to address an issue on which the\nfederal appellate courts were substantially in agreement,  Sandoval  may augur future\nperils for\nsubstantive agency rules condemning disparate impact under Title VI.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "American Law"
  ]
}