{ "id": "RL31222", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31222", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 102090, "date": "2002-05-16", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:10:32.435941", "title": "Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs. Bilateral Reductions", "summary": "On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to reduce U.S. strategic\nnuclear\nweapons to between 1,700 and 2,000 operationally deployed warheads. He noted that he would\nmake these reductions unilaterally, without pursuing a formal arms control agreement with Russia. \nPresident Putin welcomed the proposed reductions, but argued that they should be made through a\nformal treaty. Although the United States eventually agreed to sign a \"legally binding\" agreement,\nofficials in the Bush Administration have argued that the United States should not be bound by\nformal arms control treaties. It argues that many of these agreements do not limit threats to the\nUnited States but they do restrict U.S. flexibility in ensuring its national security. But, the absence\nof formal arms control treaties would bring about changes in the role of Congress; the Senate has a\nconstitutionally-mandated role in giving advice and consent to the ratification of formal treaties but\nwould have no role in approving informal agreements. This approach would also change the role\nof arms control in the relationship between the United States and Russia.\n The United States and Soviet Union used negotiated treaties and unilateral measures to reduce\ntheir nuclear forces. The START I Treaty, which reduced strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and\nSTART II Treaty, which did not enter into force, are examples of the former; the 1991 Presidential\nnuclear initiatives, which eliminated non-strategic nuclear weapons, are an example of the latter. \nA review of these cases highlights relative strengths and weaknesses of these two mechanisms. \nFormal treaties allow the participants to understand and predict future changes in forces and threats,\nallow for transparency in monitoring those forces, and allow for balanced and equitable trades\nbetween the forces of the participating parties. On the other hand, the search for balanced trades and\nthe need for detailed definitions tends to lengthen the negotiating process, while the detailed\nprovisions and requirements lengthen and add to the cost of the implementation process. Unilateral\nmeasures, on the other hand, can be devised and implemented more quickly, allow for more\n\"sweeping changes,\" and provide the participants with the flexibility to reverse their reductions, if\nnecessary. However, they often do not provide transparency or predictability, and there is the\npotential for destabilizing reversals.\n The Bush Administration's proposals demonstrate many, but not all of these characteristics. \nThe President announced his proposed reductions relatively quickly, but he plans to implement them\nat a slow pace, over 10 years. And, although his reductions appear to move well beyond those\nimplemented under START I, they are no more \"sweeping\" than reductions that have been\nconsidered for the past 10 years under START II and a potential START III Treaty. The President\ndid not propose any new monitoring measures, but the United States and Russia are likely to\ncontinue to implement the monitoring regime from START I to improve transparency with future\nreductions. Finally, the President and his advisers have highlighted the fact that these measures will\nprovide the United States with the flexibility to reduce or restore its forces quickly. Russia, on the\nother hand, may feel threatened by the U.S. ability to reverse its weapons reductions. And, without\nprecise definitions of those weapons that will be eliminated, disputes and suspicion could arise in\nthe future.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31222", "sha1": "b74d4492b38efce8d4d2702123bc060adabe33e0", "filename": "files/20020516_RL31222_b74d4492b38efce8d4d2702123bc060adabe33e0.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20020516_RL31222_b74d4492b38efce8d4d2702123bc060adabe33e0.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs1590/", "id": "RL31222_2001Dec17", "date": "2001-12-17", "retrieved": "2005-06-11T04:22:05", "title": "Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs. Bilateral Reductions", "summary": "This report discusses changing U.S. policy and priorities in regards to arms control. The report compares the various strengths and weaknesses of unilateral and bilateral approaches to arms reduction.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20011217_RL31222_f43bef92e41ce44cbc14c0563665ef5c13ddea96.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20011217_RL31222_f43bef92e41ce44cbc14c0563665ef5c13ddea96.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Defense policy", "name": "Defense policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Arms control", "name": "Arms control" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Arms control negotiations", "name": "Arms control negotiations" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear nonproliferation", "name": "Nuclear nonproliferation" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "International affairs", "name": "International affairs" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }