{
  "id": "RL31281",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31281",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100724,
      "date": "2002-01-28",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:16:29.890941",
      "title": "Patent Quality and Public Policy: Issues for Innovative Firms in Domestic Markets",
      "summary": "The administration of United States Patent and Trademark Office (\"USPTO\") concerns issues\nof\nresource availability and management, as well as need to identify and prioritize the goals of federal\npatent examination procedures. This report focuses upon this latter issue. There are currently at least\nthree competing views concerning USPTO priorities.\n  One position is that the USPTO should aim to achieve a high level of patent quality. \nGovernment, industry, academia and the patent bar alike have traditionally agreed that the USPTO\napprove only those patent applications that fully describe and clearly claim an inventive advance. \nHigh quality patents fully disclose and distinctly claim a new, useful and unobvious invention, thereby\nmeeting each of the statutory requirements under the Patent Act. \n  Some commentators have challenged the notion that high patent quality should be a priority\ngoal. They believe that interested private parties are often able to assess the robustness and value of\nindividual patents more easily than the USPTO, making a USPTO \"hard look\" during its examination\nprocedures economically inefficient. Moreover, because relatively few patents are ultimately licensed\nor the subject of litigation, other observers have argued that it may be inefficient to conduct rigorous\nexamination proceedings for all patents. These varying perspectives hold implications for the\nadministration of the patent system. \n  Each of three views possesses its merits and shortcomings. Uniformly high levels of patent\nquality may be difficult for the USPTO to maintain in light of budget constraints and increasing\nworkloads. However, improvidently granted patents may lead to certain social costs. Stringent\npatent grant proceedings could potentially limit some of these costs.\n  Legislation introduced before the 107th Congress bears upon the patent quality issue. In the\nevent that Congress further considers this issue, USPTO administrative practices may be reviewed\nwith an eye towards their capability for maintaining high levels of patent quality within current\nresource constraints. Congress may wish to consider whether patent examiners have appropriate\nresources and training that will allow them to conduct a rigorous review of patent applications. The\nresponsibilities of patent applicants to contribute to quality patent examination may also be weighed. \nFinally, Congress might choose to assess the contributions members of the general public might make\nwithin an optimal patent examination regime, for example, by encouraging interested third parties to\ncomment upon pending patent applications.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31281",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economic Policy"
  ]
}