{
  "id": "RL31337",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31337",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101138,
      "date": "2002-03-19",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:13:47.566941",
      "title": "Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects",
      "summary": "The issue of missile defense cooperation with Japan intersects with several issues of direct\nconcern\nto Congress, ranging from support for developing a capability to protect U.S. regional forces,\nAsia-Pacific allies, and Taiwan, from Chinese short- and medium-range missiles, to countering a\npossible future threat to U.S. territory from long-range missiles developed by North Korea. Japan's\ncurrent participation in the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program dates from August 1999,\nwhen the Japanese government agreed to conduct cooperative research on four components of the\ninterceptor missile being developed for the then U.S. Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) anti-missile\nsystem--a sea-based \"upper tier\" (exo-atmospheric) capability against short- and medium-range\nmissiles up to 3,500 kilometers. \n  In the spring of 2001, the Administration changed the context of the cooperative research effort\nwhen it reorganized and redirected the U.S. missile defense program to emphasize the employment\nof specific technologies across the entire spectrum of missile defense challenges, but especially to\ngain a limited, near-term capability to defeat missile attacks on U.S. territory by \"rogue\" states. The\nPentagon redesignated the NTW program as the Sea-Based Midcourse System, with a goal of\ndeveloping a capability for attacking missiles of all ranges in the initial or middle phases of their\nflight path. This change added to an already complex list of Japanese policy concerns, by putting\nJapan in the position of possibly cooperating in the development of technology that could become\npart of an American national missile defense capability -- a step that many Japanese see as\ntransgressing a constitutional ban on \"collective defense.\"\n  Thus far, the Administration's program change has not deterred Japan from cooperative\nresearch on missile defense, but the policy shift has unsettled Japanese leaders and created additional\npolitical obstacles to bilateral BMD cooperation. The new U.S. approach has been criticized in the\nJapanese press and the Diet (parliament), both because of the potential violation of the implied ban\non \"collective defense\" contained in Article 9 of Japan's U.S.-imposed \"Peace Constitution,\" and\nalso because the Bush initiative requires the United States to withdraw from the U.S.-Russian\nAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which Tokyo has long regarded as an important element of\nstrategic stability. An integrated U.S.-Japan BMD capability aimed at protecting third countries\nwould raise the same constitutional issues. \n  Japan has not made a decision regarding the acquisition of a missile defense capability. \nJapanese policymakers and defense firms generally are enthusiastic about missile defense\ncooperation, but the political parties, the media, and the general public are split over the issue. \nProponents view BMD cooperation as a means to counter a perceived North Korean missile threat,\nand perhaps a Chinese threat as well. Other Japanese are fearful of aggravating relations with China\nor triggering an Asian missile race. Even groups in Japan favoring BMD cooperation are concerned\nabout the large costs associated with the still-unproven technology. The popular Koizumi\nadministration seems inclined to finesse the constitutional issue, if possible. Japan's future stance\nwill likely depend on regional developments and how the issue plays out in the currently unstable\npolitical environment.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Constitutional Questions",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}