{ "id": "RL31354", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31354", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101150, "date": "2002-04-08", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:12:37.439941", "title": "Possible Impacts of Major Counter Terrorism Security Actions on Research, Development, and Higher Education", "summary": "The Congress, the executive branch, and scientific and technical communities have adopted and\nare\nconsidering research and development (R&D) and education-related security measures to\ncounteract\nterrorism. There is widespread agreement on the need for these measures, but some experts say that\nthey could have unintended consequences. Some of these actions are included in the\nPATRIOT/USA Act, P.L. 107-56 ; in addition the Office of Homeland Security, federal agencies, and\nthe scientific and technical community have proposed or taken other actions. Activities relating to\nhigher education (in H.R. 3525 , S. 1749 , and other bills) include\ncontrolling the visa entry and educational programs of foreign students and tracking their movement\nthrough the higher education system. Activities relating to limiting access to scientific and technical\ninformation include controlling access to R&D laboratories, self-policing, classification and\nreclassification of already released materials, withdrawal of information from federal agency\nwebsites, possible additional exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, (FOIA) and\nwithholding information categorized as \"sensitive but unclassified.\" Legislative proposals dealing\nwith access to biological agents that could be used by terrorists appear in H.R. 3448 ,\n S. 1765 , H.R. 3160 , S. 1635 , H.R. 3457 , and\n S. 1764 . These include proposals to register users of potentially toxic biological and\nchemical agents; to inventory laboratories that conduct research using pathogenic biological agents;\nto limit access to R&D laboratories and biological research agents; and to give tax preferences\nto\nfirms that develop tools to deal with bioterrorism. \n Among the unintended consequences of these actions, as cited by experts, are high financial\ncosts, especially to academic laboratories, of instituting security and tracking measures, the possible\ndeleterious impacts on freedom of scientific information exchange and scientific inquiry, and the\npossible loss to the United States of foreign technical workers in areas of short supply among U.S.\ncitizens. Policymakers might seek to ensure that those affected by counter terrorism policies that\naffect R&D -- scientists, academics, industrialists, and the public -- are involved in\nsecurity-related\ndecisionmaking and implementation of regulations.\n Through \"Operation Shield America,\" the Customs Service has expanded prohibitions on\ntechnology exports which terrorists could use. Some say that this might help to prevent terrorism;\nothers say it could possibly reduce the competitiveness of U.S. technology sales in world markets. \n The National Academy of Sciences, the American Chemical Society, the American\nPsychological Association, and other professional groups have offered to assist the government and\nare monitoring opportunities for their members to compete for federal awards for counter terrorism\nR&D and related activities.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31354", "sha1": "a7de23474ea27878de0ea86a03fc9fdb689fe880", "filename": "files/20020408_RL31354_a7de23474ea27878de0ea86a03fc9fdb689fe880.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20020408_RL31354_a7de23474ea27878de0ea86a03fc9fdb689fe880.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense", "Science and Technology Policy" ] }