{ "id": "RL31360", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31360", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 105327, "date": "2002-04-10", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:12:13.335941", "title": "Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): Potential National Security Questions Pertaining to a Single Production Line", "summary": "The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is intended to develop and build a family of\nnew-generation\ntactical combat aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Navy, and Britain's Royal\nNavy. As now projected, the JSF will become the U.S. Defense Department's (DoD) largest ever\nacquisition program in terms of future cost and number of aircraft to be produced.\n A controversial aspect of the JSF program has been the \"winner-take-all\" approach that DoD\nused to award the development and demonstration contract. On October 26, 2001, senior DoD\nofficials announced that a team led by Lockheed Martin (and composed of Northrop Grumman, and\nBAE Systems) had beaten a team led by the Boeing Company, winning the exclusive rights to enter\nthe JSF program's system development and demonstration (SDD) phase, and to build all 2,912 JSF\naircraft. Some observers contend that DoD's \"winner-take-all\" approach to JSF production could\nhave negative implications for the defense industrial base and U.S. national security. \n In official communications, DoD has consistently maintained that the winner-take-all approach\nis the best vehicle for acquiring the JSF because it is the most cost effective strategy, and that any\ndefense industrial base concerns can be dealt with as they arise. Aerospace industry officials have\nalso publically expressed their support for the winner-take-all strategy. Congressional support for\nthe approach appears mixed, and legislation has been enacted mandating a detailed study of the\npotential industrial base implications.\n It appears that a substantial amount of analysis has focused on the cost implications of the\nwinner-take-all strategy versus splitting the JSF contract between two or more producers. However,\nit also appears that to date, much less analysis has focused on the potential defense industrial base\nconsequences. \n When considering the potential national security implications of a single manufacturer of the\nJSF, the following questions of potential interest to Congress arise: 1) Will awarding production of\nthe JSF to a \"single manufacturer\" degrade the future U.S. defense industrial base's ability to\ngenerate competition in the design of short range manned combat aircraft, such as the JSF in the\npost JSF time frame? 2) Will there be a demand for short range manned combat aircraft in the\npost-JSF environment? \n Observers tend to agree that maintaining combat aircraft design capabilities is more critical and\nmore difficult than maintaining production capabilities. Yet, there is disagreement about whether\ndesign capabilities can be maintained in the absence of continued work. Also, many argue that other\nplatforms, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, could supplant manned combat aircraft in the post-JSF\nfuture. Other observers disagree, and argue that it is likely that DoD will require a manned combat\naircraft after JSF, if only for niche missions.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31360", "sha1": "d7c05070ebb6c6ea0f7268b723faf6dbfd4b84a7", "filename": "files/20020410_RL31360_d7c05070ebb6c6ea0f7268b723faf6dbfd4b84a7.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20020410_RL31360_d7c05070ebb6c6ea0f7268b723faf6dbfd4b84a7.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }