{
  "id": "RL31539",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31539",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101123,
      "date": "2002-10-22",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:03:07.812941",
      "title": "Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy",
      "summary": "The collapse of the USSR and its framework of totalitarian control raised fears of rampant\nnuclear\nproliferation, fueled by leakages of fissile materials from increasingly insecure Russian stockpiles. \nA major U.S. concern is that such materials and even complete nuclear weapons could gravitate into\ndangerous hands, increasing the array of potentially lethal dangers to Western security and stability.\n  The dimensions of this threat have not been precisely calibrated. The amount of\nweapons-usable material leaking out of Russia has been small. Little visible evidence exists of\nparticipation by terrorists or rogue states in the black market for stolen highly-enriched uranium or\nplutonium. Indeed, terrorists and rogues may place a higher priority on other weapons of mass\ndestruction (WMD) objectives or, in the case of states, on domestic manufacture of nuclear bomb\ningredients. Nevertheless, the possibility can be considered that the observed market in the West\ndoes not reflect the true state of affairs, because many smuggling incidents might go undetected or\nunreported. Various worrisome scenarios can be contemplated, from a \"shadow market\" organized\nby professionals and brokered by criminals to outright \"state-sponsored\" proliferation by\nhigh-ranking Russian officials.\n  The United States is funding a broad range of activities in Russia and other newly independent\nstates (NIS) of the former Soviet Union designed to stem outflows of nuclear material, weapons and\nweapons design intelligence. Such programs have been controversial: some believe that they have\nbeen underfunded and advocate major expansion, while others see the programs as intrinsically\nunworkable in the Russian context or -- put bluntly, that \"nothing much can be done.\" Pervasive\ncrime and corruption and Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran (which seemingly contradicts the\ngoal of non-proliferation) are cited to support the latter position. Recent congressional budget\ndecisions and bipartisan legislation currently before Congress, indicate a desire that investment in\nproliferation prevention in the NIS should be increased significantly.\n  Nevertheless, concerns remain that more investment by itself will not translate into increased\neffectiveness against serious proliferation episodes, especially those organized by well-placed\nnuclear insiders and corrupt officials in response to a lucrative offer from states or groups of concern. \nTechnological and managerial improvements are being introduced in existing programs to address\nsuch contingencies: yet some experts argue that Washington should move beyond what is now a\nreactive and containment-oriented strategy to focus more on the demand-side of the proliferation\nequation. In particular, improved intelligence collection on potential adversaries -- who they are,\nwhat they want and how they plan to obtain it--is seen as a vital tool for guiding resource allocation\nand project management decisions on proliferation prevention and in strengthening overall prospects\nfor nuclear risk management in the NIS.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31539",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}