{ "id": "RL31542", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31542", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 104236, "date": "2004-02-10", "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:27:56.925862", "title": "Homeland Security -- Reducing the Vulnerability of Public and Private Information Infrastructures to Terrorism: An Overview", "summary": "This report assesses the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on public and private\ninformation\ninfrastructures in the context of critical infrastructure protection, continuity of operations (COOP)\nplanning, and homeland security. Analysis of the effects of the terrorist attacks suggests various\n\"lessons learned.\" These lessons support three general principles. The first principle emphasizes\nthe establishment and practice of comprehensive continuity and recovery plans. One lesson learned\nin this area is to augment disaster recovery plans . Businesses and agencies, who now\nmust consider\nthe possibility of complete destruction and loss of a building, may need to augment their disaster\nrecovery plans to include the movement of people, the rapid acquisition of equipment and furniture,\nnetwork connectivity, adequate workspace, and more. A corollary to this lesson learned is the need\nto assure that recovery procedures are well documented and safeguarded so that they can be fully\nutilized when necessary. A second lesson is the need to back up data and \napplications . Without\na comprehensive backup system that captures more than just an organization's data files, a\nsignificant amount of time can be lost trying to re-create applications, organize data, and reestablish\nuser access. A corollary to this lesson learned is the need to fully and regularly test backup sites and\nmedia to ensure their reliability and functionality. \n The second principle focuses on the decentralization of operations and the effectiveness of\ndistributed communications. The lesson of decentralizing operations can be applied to\nthe structure\nand location of an organization's operations. Industry experts suggest recovery sites be located at\nleast 20-50 miles away form the primary work site. In addition, some observers suggest that human\nresources should also be located in more than one place to reduce the potential for losing a\nsignificant portion of one's workforce in a single event. Another lesson in this area is to ensure\nthe\nability to communicate with internal and external constituencies . In the event of an\nemergency, the\ndemand for information skyrockets. An organization not only needs to communicate with employees\nregarding actions and procedures, but also with the citizens and customers to whom it is responsible\nfor providing goods and services. \n The third principle involves the institutionalization of system redundancies to eliminate single\npoints of weakness. In this context, the lesson of employing redundant service providers \nis applied\nprimarily to telecommunications services. In the event a central switching station is disabled, having\nmultiple providers using different infrastructures for access can reduce the possibility of an\norganization losing its communications services and being unable to carry out its responsibilities. \nAnother related lesson learned is the use of generic replaceable technology . In the event\nof a\ncatastrophe, the ability to replace equipment quickly with easy-to-find products that do not require\ncomprehensive customization, can contribute significantly to how quickly an organization's\noperations can be functional again. This report will not be updated.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL31542", "sha1": "06354d100f244ed7adbf0fe08cf80320dcacfd41", "filename": "files/20040210_RL31542_06354d100f244ed7adbf0fe08cf80320dcacfd41.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31542", "sha1": "7a5141b60544866de0d7a5748b96b312a4088f05", "filename": "files/20040210_RL31542_7a5141b60544866de0d7a5748b96b312a4088f05.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs3175/", "id": "RL31542 2002-12-12", "date": "2002-12-12", "retrieved": "2005-06-11T21:04:27", "title": "Homeland Security - Reducing the Vulnerability of Public and Private Information Infrastructures to Terrorism: An Overview", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20021212_RL31542_ecdd305cbca1d80131a972417861877bdb3bfe74.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20021212_RL31542_ecdd305cbca1d80131a972417861877bdb3bfe74.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Infrastructure", "name": "Infrastructure" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Terrorism", "name": "Terrorism" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Information networks", "name": "Information networks" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Telecommunication", "name": "Telecommunication" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Criminal justice", "name": "Criminal justice" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Technology", "name": "Technology" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Intelligence and National Security" ] }