{
  "id": "RL31617",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31617",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101413,
      "date": "2002-09-27",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:04:21.039941",
      "title": "The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment",
      "summary": "The tragedy of September 11, 2001 was so sudden and devastating that it may be difficult at this\npoint in time to write dispassionately and objectively about its effects on the U.S. economy. This\nretrospective review will attempt such an undertaking. The loss of lives and property was not large\nenough to have had a measurable effect on the productive capacity of the United States even though\nit had a very significant localized effect on New York City and, to a lesser degree, on the greater\nWashington, D.C. area. Thus, for the tragedy to affect the economy it would have had to have\naffected the price of an important input, such as energy, or had an adverse effect on aggregate\ndemand via such mechanisms as consumer and business confidence, a financial panic or liquidity\ncrisis, or an international run on the dollar.\n  It was initially thought that aggregate demand was seriously affected, for while the existing data\nshowed that GDP growth was low in the first half of 2001, data published in October showed that\nGDP had contracted during the 3rd quarter. This led to the claim that \"The terrorist attacks pushed\na weak economy over the edge into an outright recession.\" We now know, based on revised data,\nthis is not so. At the time the economy was in its third consecutive quarter of contraction; positive\ngrowth resumed in the 4th quarter. This would suggest that any effects from September 11 on\ndemand were short lived. While this may be true, several events took place before, on, and shortly\nafter September 11 that made recovery either more rapid than it might have been or made it possible\nto take place. First, the Federal Reserve had eased credit during the first half of 2001 to stimulate\naggregate demand. The economy responds to policy changes with a lag in time. Thus, the public\nresponse may have been felt in the 4th quarter giving the appearance that the tragedy had only a\nlimited effect. Second, the Federal Reserve on and immediately after September 11 took appropriate\naction to avert a financial panic and liquidity shortage. This was supplemented by support from\nforeign central banks to shore up the dollar in world markets and limited the contagion from\nspreading to other national economies. Nevertheless, U.S. trade with other countries, especially\nCanada, was disrupted. While oil prices spiked briefly, they quickly returned to their pre-September\n11 levels.\n  Thus, it can be argued, timely action contained the short run economic effects of September\n11 on the overall economy. Over the longer run the tragedy will adversely affect U.S. productivity\ngrowth because resources are being and will be used to ensure the security of production,\ndistribution, finance, and communication. \n   This report is retrospective in nature and will not be updated.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31617",
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Domestic Social Policy",
    "Economic Policy",
    "Energy Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Industry and Trade",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "Legislative Process"
  ]
}