{ "id": "RL31650", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31650", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101444, "date": "2003-01-16", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:00:08.573941", "title": "The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Congressional Hearings and the Status of the Investigation", "summary": "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led many to inquire whether there had been a failure\nby\nUnited States intelligence agencies to collect all available information about the plots that led to the\nattacks, to analyze it properly, and disseminate it in time to protect the American public. \nCongressional intelligence committees responded by launching an unprecedented Joint Inquiry to\ninvestigate the Intelligence Community's record in regard to the 9/11 attacks and make\nrecommendations for further legislative action. The Joint Inquiry began its investigation in February\n2002 and held public hearings in September and October. Findings, conclusions, and\nrecommendations were made public in December 2002; release of the final report is anticipated in\n2003.\n \n In public hearings, the Joint Inquiry's Staff Director traced salient aspects of the Inquiry's work\nand emphasized that, whereas the Intelligence Community provided ample warning of an impending\nattack in mid-2001 against the U.S. by the Islamic terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden, the\nCommunity did not learn in advance the plans for the aircraft hijackings that occurred on September\n11. \n The Joint Inquiry focused on several underlying problems. For a number of Constitutional,\nstatutory, and organization reasons, information collected by intelligence agencies has historically\nnot been routinely used for law enforcement purposes. Similarly, information collected in\npreparation for trials has not been routinely forwarded to intelligence agencies. In an era in which\nterrorists work abroad to launch attacks in the U.S., some have argued that the \"walls\" between\nintelligence and law enforcement have complicated the ability of any agency to put together a\ncomplete picture of evolving plots. Explaining the complexity of this situation was a major\ncontribution of the Inquiry, although the issue of breaching these \"walls\" remains complicated and\ncontroversial.\n In addition, the Inquiry examined the role of the FBI. There were criticisms of the Bureau's\nability to: process and store information; provide communications links between field offices and\nheadquarters; process applications for surveillance; and coordinate with intelligence agencies. More\nfundamentally, the intelligence committees examined priorities that, prior to September 11, 2001,\ndid not emphasize counterterrorism to the extent that has subsequently been considered necessary. \n The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-306 ) establishes an independent\ncommission to assess the role of agencies throughout the government with regard to the 9/11 attacks. \nThis independent commission, to be headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, will\nbuild upon the investigatory record of the Joint Inquiry, but might reach further to assess\norganizational issues and the proper relationship of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This\nreport will be updated as circumstances dictate.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL31650", "sha1": "9387a5504ea952a6e870a4917e70faec4eb1c94f", "filename": "files/20030116_RL31650_9387a5504ea952a6e870a4917e70faec4eb1c94f.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31650", "sha1": "2d9d47c408fc567c1f6ba5c2609aff0eca296e5b", "filename": "files/20030116_RL31650_2d9d47c408fc567c1f6ba5c2609aff0eca296e5b.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions", "Intelligence and National Security" ] }