{
  "id": "RL31848",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31848",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 104465,
      "date": "2003-04-08",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:48:48.998544",
      "title": "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background and Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "On November 25, 2002, ninety-two countries, including the United States, signed a draft\ninternational code of conduct (ICOC) intended to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This\ncode of conduct joins the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as the primary means\nby which the international community attempts to regulate missile proliferation. Both are\narrangements, not treaties, requiring voluntary application of standards and measures by participating\ncountries. While the MTCR has been credited with a number of successes over the years, critics\npoint out that it lacks treaty status and only addresses the supply side of the missile proliferation\nequation. The ICOC was developed primarily to focus on the demand aspect of proliferation but\na great deal of work may lie ahead for the drafters and signatories of the ICOC in order to craft the\ncode into a useful nonproliferation tool.\n  The MTCR has been credited by many analysts with slowing or impeding missile proliferation\nand preventing many countries from advancing beyond SCUD-based missile technology. The ICOC,\ncreated by MTCR members, is intended to employ confidence building measures (CBMs) as a means\nto promote transparency and hopefully decrease the demand for ballistic missiles among developing\nnations. The existence of two multilateral missile nonproliferation arrangements leads to the\npossibility of potential synergies but also could result in conflicts that could reduce the overall\neffectiveness of the arrangements.\n  The Bush Administration cites both the MTCR and ICOC in the 2002 National Strategy to\nCombat Weapons of Mass Destruction. While U.S. commitment to the MTCR is acknowledged \nby the international community, many countries feel there is less U.S. commitment to the ICOC. \nThe United States sees useful roles for both arrangements in dealing with missile proliferation but\nappears to place a great deal more emphasis on the MTCR than the ICOC.\n  Both arrangements are administered through the interagency process with the U.S. State\nDepartment assuming lead agency responsibilities in both cases. While no laws related to the U.S.\ninvolvement in the ICOC currently exist, there are a number of key pieces of legislation dealing with\nthe MTCR. There are several proposals that might be put before Congress which proponents believe\ncould potentially improve the efficacy of both the MTCR and ICOC, and increase their usefulness\nas a means of addressing the global issue of missile proliferation. This report will be updated as\nsignificant events occur.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}