{
  "id": "RL31860",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31860",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101855,
      "date": "2003-05-27",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:44:04.658544",
      "title": "U.S. - European Union Disputes in the World Trade Organization",
      "summary": "U.S.-EU relations have been affected by a number of trade disputes in recent years. While the\nmajority of trade disputes do get resolved, attempts to settle some of the disputes have been met with\nrefusal or inability by one or another of the parties to comply in a timely manner with the World\nTrade Organization (WTO) panel rulings. The 108th Congress inherits several of these disputes\nwhere the WTO has ruled that U.S. laws violate trade obligations. Absent U.S. compliance through\nlegislative action, the EU could in some cases decide to retaliate against U.S. exports this year or\nnext. In the meantime, the EU remains in non-compliance with its WTO obligations to allow\nimports of beef treated with hormones. Beyond raising U.S.-EU trade tensions, non-compliance by\na key WTO member arguably weakens the credibility and authority of the WTO and its dispute\nsettlement process.\n  The initiation and resolution of disputes under WTO agreements is carried out under the\nUruguay Round Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), considered a cornerstone of the WTO\nsystem. The WTO dispute settlement process has a more quasi-judicial orientation than the\nquasi-diplomatic orientation of the prior GATT system, in which negotiation and conciliation\ngenerally prevailed over multilateral enforcement of rules. The DSU provides for virtually automatic\nestablishment of panels, adoption of panel and appellate reports and, where requested, authorization\nto impose retaliatory measures; deadlines are set out for various stages of the process. These features\nensure that complaints are heard and promote implementation of WTO rulings, thus making\navailable to all WTO Members the means to clarify trade rules and redress trade injury. At the same\ntime, the process continues to retain certain diplomatic elements in that its primary aim is to \"secure\na positive solution to a dispute,\" with the preferred outcome being a \"solution mutually acceptable\nto the parties to the dispute and consistent with the covered agreements.\" Opportunities for\nsettlement are provided at a number of points in a procedure. \n  U.S. and EU instances of longstanding non-compliance have for the most part not involved\nroutine commercial disputes over trade or customs regulations, but rather tax policy and internal\nnational regulation, particularly of social and health matters. While ambiguity in WTO agreements\nmay give rise to disputes in these difficult areas, the automatic features of the DSU also allow parties\nto pursue such cases through the full dispute process, even though it may be evident from the outset\nthat implementation of an adverse WTO ruling may be subject to overwhelming domestic opposition\nin the defending country. To deal with the problem of non-compliance in difficult cases, both\nWashington and Brussels may need to give greater attention to a number of concerns and policy\nconsiderations, including choice of cases initiated, limitations on panel decisions, role of mediation\nand conciliation, and adoption of remedies that are trade liberalizing. Assuming that some disputes\nare not well-suited for the DSU process, greater efforts may be needed to settle differences through\nbilateral negotiations and political compromises, through mediation, or by agreeing to arbitration\nfrom an outside ( i.e. , non-WTO) party. This report will be updated periodically. For\nmore on the\nWTO dispute settlement process and U.S.-EU Trade Relations, see  CRS Report RS20088  and CRS Issue Brief IB10087.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "encoding": "utf-8",
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL31860",
          "sha1": "c20f4bc7613a1f663c20d805e1c7cf87a41aeb91",
          "filename": "files/20030527_RL31860_c20f4bc7613a1f663c20d805e1c7cf87a41aeb91.html",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31860",
          "sha1": "3b0fc1e241ef9351c15bd2ac4738f019fa7becfc",
          "filename": "files/20030527_RL31860_3b0fc1e241ef9351c15bd2ac4738f019fa7becfc.pdf",
          "images": null
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": []
}