{ "id": "RL31864", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL31864", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 103336, "date": "2003-10-30", "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:35:35.253544", "title": "High-Threat Biological Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications", "summary": "The anthrax mailings in 2001, which culminated in 5 deaths, 22 infections, and contamination\nof\nboth postal and congressional buildings, intensified concerns about terrorist use of biological agents. \nThis event increased Congressional interest in actions to limit the vulnerability of the United States\nto such attacks. High-threat biological agents, defined by the Centers for Disease Control and\nPrevention as Category A pathogens, are considered relatively easy to disseminate, have high\nmortality, and have the potential for major public health impacts.\n High-threat biological agents cause different symptoms in their victims, depending on the\npathogen. Since the nature of these agents differs, no single treatment can be given in the case of\na biological attack. As a result, treatment of the victims of a biological attack, especially one which\nis covert, may be difficult. The identification process for many pathogens may be complicated by\ntheir incubation period, and the lack of distinct symptoms early in the disease's progress. The\ndifficulties in treating the various high-threat agents may place strain on the resources of the medical\nsystem, especially in the case of mass casualties. \n Protection from biological agents is an area of active research and development. The range of\nprotection and detection equipment available to first responders has led to questions regarding\nequipment standardization and state and local preparedness. Development and distribution of\nvaccines continues to be a contentious issue. Attempts to detect biological releases using sensor\ntechnologies, or through analyzing public health data, continue to be implemented, but these\ntechnologies are in relatively early stages of development.\n It is unclear whether terrorist groups are capable of effectively using biological agents as\nweapons of mass destruction, but the relatively small amounts of pathogen that may be needed to\nexecute a significant attack is a source of concern. Some suggest that terrorist interest in biological\nagents is increasing. However, others assert that technical difficulties would make mass casualty\nattacks unlikely. \n Current policies seek to reduce the proliferation of biological weapons by relying on both\ndomestic and international controls, to increase the number of countermeasures available against\nsuch pathogens through research and development activities, to improve the nation's ability to detect\npathogen releases, and to increase the ability of hospitals and care providers to treat mass casualties. \n Policymakers may be called upon to further address potential biological terrorism\nvulnerabilities, including overseeing the use of atmospheric monitoring equipment for pathogen\ndetection; the direction of continued research and development into biological agent detectors;\nreview of further research into protective equipment, prophylaxis and treatment against high-threat\npathogens; and assessment of first responder emergency preparedness. This report will be updated\nas events warrant.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL31864", "sha1": "bd4f155cdb6ee1214303ffc9530a931ae4563ac8", "filename": "files/20031030_RL31864_bd4f155cdb6ee1214303ffc9530a931ae4563ac8.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31864", "sha1": "c41927cb9caa0eb0c6f6e2b8395565030dd58e09", "filename": "files/20031030_RL31864_c41927cb9caa0eb0c6f6e2b8395565030dd58e09.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Intelligence and National Security" ] }