{
  "id": "RL31871",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31871",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 102719,
      "date": "2003-04-24",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:47:17.730544",
      "title": "Post-War Iraq: Potential Issues Raised by Previous Occupation and Peacekeeping Experiences",
      "summary": "In the immediate aftermath of the coalition victory in Iraq, U.S. policymakers face a number of\ndecisions regarding security and government in post-war Iraq. While there are significant differences\nbetween the Iraq situation and other post-war experiences, observations and \"lessons learned\" from\nsuch experiences might be relevant. This report will discuss six security and governance issues\nraised by previous experiences, with particular reference to U.S. post-World War II occupation\nexperiences and also peacekeeping experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It may be updated\nas new issues arise for which assessments of previous experiences might be useful. \n  Previous experience suggests three key decisions on security in post-war Iraq which\npolicymakers must take. These are: (1) what security tasks must be performed, (2) who should\nperform them, and (3) how large should an occupation military force be, and how long should it\nremain? Many tasks must be performed in order to guarantee the security of citizens and property\nin the post-conflict environment, several of which require \"constabulary\" forces, i.e., those\npossessing both military and policing skills. In previous major U.S. occupations, U.S. soldiers\ninitially performed most policing tasks, turning them over to indigenous police as the situation\nallowed. In the 1990s, peacekeepers increasingly assumed policing functions as the need to\nguarantee security for property and citizens in the aftermath of conflict became apparent. Many\nanalysts have argued that policing functions are not appropriate for U.S. forces, as they can erode\nwarfighting and many also believe that appropriately trained civilian police are often preferable. \nThe lack of such personnel, however, has been a problem in current peacekeeping operations. The\nsize of an occupation force, and the length of time that it should remain in place during an\noccupation government depends on many factors, including in particular the tasks it undertakes and\nthe cooperation it receives from Iraqis. \n  Policymakers must also decide what type of assistance to provide Iraq in creating a new\ngovernment and supporting institutions to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the Hussein\ngovernment. Three issues are: (1) who should form a post-war government for Iraq, (2) what are\nthe possibilities of and means to achieving democracy in Iraq, and (3) how long is a peacebuilding\npresence necessary? While the U.S. government has taken charge of the formation of a new Iraqi\ngovernment, with the intent of encouraging the creation of democratic institutions and practices,\nsome analysts believe that the possibilities for creating a viable and democratic Iraqi government\nwould be enhanced if the United Nations were to assume that role. Some senior U.S. officials had\ncontemplated an occupation of some two years, which some experience suggests may be inadequate\nto create stable institutions. Studies of past peacekeeping experiences point to the special need for\nconsiderable attention to building capacities to assure the rule of law, conducting elections at an\nappropriate time, and possibly providing for interim powersharing arrangements. Some have also\nadvocated creating or supporting channels for political participation by civic society and local\ngroups.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
  ]
}