{
  "id": "RL31883",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31883",
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  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department",
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      "id": 302037,
      "date": "2005-03-08",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:51:16.762029",
      "title": "Counterintelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives",
      "summary": "Troubled by reported lapses in security and counterintelligence (CI) at the Department of Energy\n(DOE), the Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security\nAdministration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE\u2019s national security-related programs ( P.L.\n106-65 ). \nWithin NNSA, Congress created the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to\n implement \nCI policy at NNSA facilities. DOE retained a separate Office of Counterintelligence, which\n develops \nCI policy for DOE and NNSA, but,  implements  it only at non-NNSA facilities. Though\nrepresenting\nseparate organizations, the two CI offices share resources and personnel for some programs. \nAlthough DOE has taken steps to strengthen CI practices, some observers have questioned whether\nthe Department\u2019s bifurcated CI structure is the most effective in countering continuing\nefforts by\nforeign intelligence services, friendly and hostile, to target DOE and NNSA facilities.\n \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Several organizational approaches have been discussed, including\nthe following. \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0One approach is to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest\nthat the current structure is\nnecessary if CI is to receive the attention it warrants. Opponents counter that dual offices lead to\ninefficiencies that could undermine CI effectiveness. \n \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Under a second approach, DOE and NNSA CI programs could\nbe completely separated. \nProponents suggest that this approach would establish clearer lines of authority. Opponents counter\nthat this arrangement would produce chaos at the field level and lead to coordination and\ncommunication problems. \n \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0A third approach would be to give NNSA authority to implement\nall CI programming, while\npreserving for DOE all CI policymaking responsibility. Proponents suggest that doing so would\nresult in integrated and coordinated CI operational activity. Opponents counter that this approach\nstill would leave in place two separate CI offices and lead to continuing confusion over roles and\nmission. \n \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Finally, Congress could consolidate the two CI programs, either\nunder the direct control of the\nEnergy Secretary, or under the supervision of the NNSA administrator. Proponents of DOE control\nassert that the importance of CI argues for a consolidated office that answers directly to the DOE\nSecretary. Opponents contend consolidation within DOE would contravene Congress\u2019s\nintent to\nmaximize NNSA autonomy in all areas, including CI, because of DOE\u2019s perceived deeply\nrooted\nanti-security culture. They recommend that all CI programs be consolidated, but under the NNSA\nAdministrator rather than the Energy Secretary. \n \n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Former DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham proposed consolidating\nthe two CI programs into a\nsingle office reporting directly to the Energy Secretary. Congress, however, continues to support the\nbifurcated program. Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman is reviewing various legislative\nproposals, including one that would consolidate the two CI programs under DOE control. This\nreport will be updated as warranted.",
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    {
      "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department",
      "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc815574/",
      "id": "RL31883_2003Jul21",
      "date": "2003-07-21",
      "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26",
      "title": "Counterintelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives",
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