{
  "id": "RL31946",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31946",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101628,
      "date": "2003-06-04",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:43:45.480544",
      "title": "Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress",
      "summary": "The recent war against Iraq may have implications for various defense programs of interest to\nCongress. This report surveys some of those potential implications, and will be updated periodically\nas new information becomes available. Three cautionary notes associated with post-conflict\n\"lessons-learned\" reports apply to this report: Information about the Iraq war is incomplete and\nimperfect, so early lessons are subject to change. Each war is unique in some ways, so observers\nshould avoid \"overlearning\" the lessons of the Iraq war. And potential U.S. adversaries can derive\nlessons from the Iraq war and apply them in future conflicts against U.S. forces, possibly devaluing\nU.S.-perceived lessons. It can also be noted that some persons or organizations offering purported \nlessons of the Iraq war may have a financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue.\n  Many observers have concluded that the Iraq war validated the Administration's vision for\ndefense transformation, or major parts of it. Other observers disagree. The issue is potentially\nsignificant because implementing the Administration's vision could affect the composition of U.S.\ndefense spending, and because the Administration may invoke the theme of transformation to help\njustify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals, including proposals that\ncould affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of defense programs. The Iraq war may\ninfluence debate on whether active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently large to carry out current\nU.S. military strategy, and on whether greater emphasis should be placed on forces that are less\ndependent on access to in-theater bases.\n  One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war -- and potentially\none of those most significantly influenced by the war -- concerns the future size and composition of\nthe active-duty Army. Both supporters and opponents of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army\ndivisions may find support in the Iraq war for their positions, as may both supporters and opponents\nof the current Army plan to shift toward a mix of fewer heavy armored units and a larger number of\nlighter and more mobile units.\n  The Iraq war validated the effectiveness of combat-aircraft armed with precision-guided\nweapons, and may influence discussions about current plans for investing in specific aircraft and\nmunitions programs. The Iraq war may reinforce support generated by the war in Afghanistan for\nincreased investment in U.S. special operations forces. It may also highlight questions concerning\nreserve combat divisions and the potential consequences of extended callups of large numbers of\nreserve forces.\n  The war appears to have demonstrated the value of network-centric operations and timely\nbattlefield intelligence, and the potential value of psychological operations. It appears to have\nconfirmed the importance of preparing for urban combat. The war offered a limited real-world test\nof the Patriot missile defense system. The war may lead to renewed discussions about strategies for\nreducing friendly fire incidents. It may reinforce support for investing in aerial refueling capabilities,\nand increase interest in potential new airlift and sealift technologies.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL31946",
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
  ]
}