{ "id": "RL32137", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL32137", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 104174, "date": "2003-11-07", "retrieved": "2016-04-08T14:34:34.318544", "title": "North Korean Supporters in Japan: Issues for U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Chosen Soren (Chongryun in Korean), a group of pro-Pyongyang ethnic Koreans\npermanently\nresiding in Japan, has come under heightened scrutiny as U.S. and Japanese policy makers seek new\nways to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. With the six-party talks currently at a\nstandstill, the United States and its allies are seeking ways to pressure economically and politically\nthe Pyongyang regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The Chosen Soren organization has\nlong supported North Korea by facilitating trade, remitting cash donations, establishing personal\ncontacts, and possibly coordinating illicit transfers of narcotics and weapon parts. Japanese officials\nhave recently indicated more willingness to crack down on Chosen Soren's illegal activities. U.S.\nofficials may be prepared to cooperate with Japan in dealing with the organization as part of a\nbroader strategy of influencing North Korean actions. \n Congress has been actively engaged in its oversight of the Administration's North Korean\npolicy, including a hearing held by the Financial Management, Budget, and International Security\nSubcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on May 20, 2003, in which a North\nKorean defector testified that Chosen Soren had coordinated shipments of missile parts to the\nregime. \n This report provides a background on Chosen Soren and its membership in Japan and explores\nits relationship with the Japanese government. It goes on to discuss documented links, both legal\nand illegal, with the North Korean government, including weapons, drugs, and cash transfers. A\nthird section outlines changes to Japan's policy towards Chosen Soren, ranging from taxation policy\nto shipping surveillance to restructured credit unions. The report concludes with a brief discussion\nof possible options for Congress and U.S. officials. This report will be updated as necessary.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL32137", "sha1": "9cd8e21037a663836bde259c87ac92652a1eea54", "filename": "files/20031107_RL32137_9cd8e21037a663836bde259c87ac92652a1eea54.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL32137", "sha1": "4ea88c6aab81611364d221d69c5b5e4184c25494", "filename": "files/20031107_RL32137_4ea88c6aab81611364d221d69c5b5e4184c25494.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Intelligence and National Security" ] }