{ "id": "RL32500", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL32500", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 100080, "date": "2004-09-24", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T20:08:39.478436", "title": "Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004", "summary": "Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly\nemerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. \nThe heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of the\nDepartments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans from\nwithin the Intelligence Community itself. \n Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community emerged in the period immediately\nfollowing passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the position\nof Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). \nRecommendations have ranged from adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to the actual\ndissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other departments. The goals underlying such\nproposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environment as well\nas domestic concerns about governmental accountability.\n In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence reorganization proposals were more\nconcerned with questions of efficiency. In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number of\nrecommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligence\ncapabilities. The chairman of one committee charged with investigating the nation's intelligence\ncapabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America's sense of \"fair play\"\nwas wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination.\n Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of\nintervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committees\nfocused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted intelligence activities that included\nassassinations and some domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some forcefully questioned the\nviability of secret intelligence agencies within a democratic society. These investigations resulted\nin much closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal framework for intelligence\nactivities. At the same time, the growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an enhanced --\nbut by no means predominant -- leadership role for the DCI in determining community-wide budgets\nand priorities.\n With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns, including transnational terrorism,\nnarcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, faced the United States. \nSome statutory changes were made in the mid-1990s, but their results were not far-reaching. In the\naftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq War, some observers urge reconsidering\nthe intelligence organization. The 9/11 Commission has specifically recommended the\nestablishment of a National Intelligence Director to manage the national intelligence program. \nCurrent intelligence organization issues can be usefully addressed with an awareness of arguments\npro and con that were raised by earlier investigators; this recommendation has been incorporated in\na number of bills, including S. 2845 . This report will be updated as circumstances\nwarrant.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL32500", "sha1": "6049b4ee95c4f48d456f6b52a92cb097378cd692", "filename": "files/20040924_RL32500_6049b4ee95c4f48d456f6b52a92cb097378cd692.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL32500", "sha1": "2614b77b56d477f4ab1f95b4c634638d61687321", "filename": "files/20040924_RL32500_2614b77b56d477f4ab1f95b4c634638d61687321.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc820792/", "id": "RL32500_2004Aug04", "date": "2004-08-04", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20040804_RL32500_78a561be04d901c95de99d0d60902b74c12c398d.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20040804_RL32500_78a561be04d901c95de99d0d60902b74c12c398d.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs5969/", "id": "RL32500 2004-07-29", "date": "2004-07-29", "retrieved": "2005-06-11T21:32:12", "title": "Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20040729_RL32500_d36752a2fb31c90cb82f52d7ec74d30d0a05e063.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20040729_RL32500_d36752a2fb31c90cb82f52d7ec74d30d0a05e063.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Intelligence activities", "name": "Intelligence activities" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Executive reorganization - Law and legislation - U.S. - History", "name": "Executive reorganization - Law and legislation - U.S. - History" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Intelligence services - Law and legislation - U.S. - History", "name": "Intelligence services - Law and legislation - U.S. - History" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Executive departments", "name": "Executive departments" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }