{ "id": "RL32659", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL32659", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 306796, "date": "2004-10-29", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T20:05:17.381693", "title": "Consolidating Intelligence Appropriation and Authorization in a Single Committee: 9/11 Commission Recommendation and Alternatives", "summary": "On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also\nknown as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks\non the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Among other findings and recommendations, the\ncommission stated that existing congressional oversight was \"dysfunctional\" and recommended two\nalternative proposals to change the existing intelligence committee structure: (1) replace the existing\nSenate and House Select Intelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence; or (2)\nconsolidate intelligence appropriation and authorization functions in existing intelligence\nauthorization committees. This report discusses the second of these two proposals. (For information\non the first proposal, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals\nand\nOptions From the 9/11 Commission and Others , by Frederick M. Kaiser; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) ,\n 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- A Model for\nCongressional Oversight? , by Christopher M. Davis.)\n Under existing Senate and House rules, intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdiction\nof the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Each committee distributes these\nappropriations among five appropriations subcommittees, predominantly the Defense Appropriations\nSubcommittees. The 9/11 Commission recommended transferring jurisdiction over intelligence\nappropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligence\nauthorization committees in each chamber.\n Proponents of the commission's proposal have contended that its adoption would (1) improve\ncongressional oversight of intelligence, (2) counter-balance the commission's proposed consolidation\nof executive branch intelligence activities, (3) provide a more integrated perspective on national\nintelligence spending, (4) attract Members to the consolidated intelligence committees, and (5)\nprovide clear congressional accountability on intelligence within Congress. Opponents argue that\nconsolidation would (1) reduce oversight of program quality, (2) weaken intelligence oversight, (3)\nshortchange intelligence needs of the military, (4) concentrate too much power in intelligence\ncommittees, and (5) increase spending.\n Opponents may accordingly argue that it would be preferable to adopt the alternative\nrecommendation of the 9/11 Commission to consolidate authorizing responsibility for intelligence\nin a joint committee. A third approach would be to consolidate responsibility for intelligence\nappropriations in a new subcommittee of each the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. \nOn October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted S.Res. 445 , instituting this approach in the\nSenate. This action was based on a proposal by the Senate Majority and Minority Whips, the leaders\nof a bipartisan working group appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders. \n This report will be updated.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL32659", "sha1": "4b220a8efe90e9267159f438d359bcd66bc802fd", "filename": "files/20041029_RL32659_4b220a8efe90e9267159f438d359bcd66bc802fd.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL32659", "sha1": "ffd0bfd7278b7ed200394cb4fa0dd363c92107cd", "filename": "files/20041029_RL32659_ffd0bfd7278b7ed200394cb4fa0dd363c92107cd.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Appropriations", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security" ] }