{ "id": "RL33151", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL33151", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 309952, "date": "2005-11-16", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:27:33.527029", "title": "Committee Controls of Agency Decisions", "summary": "Congress has a long history of subjecting certain types of executive agency decisions to\ncommittee\ncontrol, either by committees or subcommittees. Especially with the beginning of World War II, the\nexecutive branch agreed to committee controls as an accommodation that allowed Congress to\ndelegate authority and funds broadly while using committees to monitor the use of that discretionary\nauthority. These committee-agency arrangements took the form of different procedures: simply\nnotifying the committee, obtaining committee approval, \"coming into agreement\" understandings,\nand using the congressional distinction between authorization and appropriation to exercise\ncommittee controls.\n By the 1930s, the White House and the Justice Department began to object to \ncommittee-approval arrangements as an encroachment into executive duties and a violation of\nseparation of powers. Litigation in the 1970s, supported by the Administration, resulted in the\nSupreme Court's decision INS v. Chadha (1983), striking down every form\nof legislative veto:\ntwo-house, one-house, committee, subcommittee, and chairman. The Court ruled that whenever\nCongress intends to exercise control over any action outside the legislative branch, it must comply\nwith the regular constitutional requirements for lawmaking: action by both houses (bicameralism)\nand submission of a bill or joint resolution to the President for his signature or veto (Presentation\nClause).\n Notwithstanding this decision, agencies continue to fashion accommodations that settle some\ndecisions at the level of committees and subcommittees. This type of arrangement is seen frequently\nin reprogramming procedures, where agencies seek committee/subcommittee approval before\nshifting certain types of funds within an appropriations account. A number of committee vetoes are\nalso used outside the reprogramming process.\n This report explains how and why committee vetoes originated, the constitutional objections\nraised by the executive branch, the Court's decision in Chadha , and the continuation of\ncommittee\nreview procedures since that time. For a brief six-page treatment, see CRS Report RS22132(pdf) ,\n Legislative Vetoes After Chadha , by Louis Fisher. This report will be updated as events\nwarrant.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL33151", "sha1": "6c5bb5adac7596afad6efb70e9f7bc8b563a4fc6", "filename": "files/20051116_RL33151_6c5bb5adac7596afad6efb70e9f7bc8b563a4fc6.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL33151", "sha1": "dfe022acc379aae6449382404737f041810b3a8b", "filename": "files/20051116_RL33151_dfe022acc379aae6449382404737f041810b3a8b.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Appropriations", "Constitutional Questions", "National Defense" ] }