{
  "id": "RL33355",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL33355",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 316924,
      "date": "2006-07-19",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T18:56:01.903029",
      "title": "Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives",
      "summary": "Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy\n(DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security\nAdministration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA,\nCongress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to  implement \nNNSA's\ncounterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI\npolicy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have\nquestioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged\nthe adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches have been\ndiscussed, including the following. \n One approach, which DOE has initiated, merges under the control of a new DOE Office of\nIntelligence and Counterintelligence DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear\nweapons programs, and DOE's CI office. Under an anticipated second phase, which would require\ncongressional approval, the new office would absorb NNSA's CI program. Proponents assert that\nconsolidation would improve command, control, and communication. Opponents argue that\nconsolidation would dilute the focus on counterintelligence at DOE's weapons labs.\n Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under the\ncontrol of the NNSA administrator. Proponents argue that a semi-autonomous agency such as\nNNSA, by virtue of its independence, is better able to implement CI measures than is DOE.\nOpponents contend that such a consolidation would undermine the effectiveness of a\ncounterintelligence program, which they argue requires a consolidated DOE-wide program that\nincludes NNSA and is under the direct control and supervision of the Energy Secretary.\n Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office under a\nnew DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity. Proponents\nargue that such an approach would not eliminate the current bifurcated structure -- a preferred\noutcome -- but would enhance overall communication and coordination between the two existing\nprograms. Opponents counter that only way to resolve coordination and communication problems\nis to consolidate the two CI programs within DOE.\n A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence\nprograms. Proponents suggest that such an approach would clarify the chain of command.\nOpponents assert that separation could further undermine coordination and communication. \n A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest that the current\nstructure is required for counterintelligence to receive focused attention at the weapons labs. \nOpponents counter that dual offices are inefficient and ultimately ineffective. This report will be\nupdated as warranted.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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    },
    {
      "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department",
      "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs9170/",
      "id": "RL33355 2006-04-10",
      "date": "2006-04-10",
      "retrieved": "2006-08-10T15:41:57",
      "title": "Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives",
      "summary": null,
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORT",
      "active": false,
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      ],
      "topics": [
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Intelligence activities",
          "name": "Intelligence activities"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Executive reorganization",
          "name": "Executive reorganization"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Independent regulatory commissions",
          "name": "Independent regulatory commissions"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Espionage",
          "name": "Espionage"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Counterintelligence",
          "name": "Counterintelligence"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Executive departments",
          "name": "Executive departments"
        }
      ]
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  "topics": []
}