{
  "id": "RL33518",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL33518",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 343227,
      "date": "2006-07-05",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T18:58:56.540029",
      "title": "Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "The Army\u2019s enlisted recruiting shortfall in 2005 generated significant congressional and media interest, and served as the impetus for several legislative initiatives. However, until very recently, there has been little mention or visibility of potential shortages in the Army\u2019s officer corps. This problem is currently unique to the Army. While specific skill shortages and imbalances have been reported by the other services, only the Army is reflecting service-wide active component shortages.\nThe Army currently projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in FY2007, with the most acute shortfalls in \u201csenior\u201d captains and majors with 11 to 17 years of experience. For example, the Army considers any personnel \u201cfill rate\u201d (the number of officers available to fill requirements) of less than 85% a \u201ccritical\u201d shortage, and projects a fill rate of 82.6% for majors in FY2007.\nThe Army further projects an increased shortage of more than 3,700 officers the following year, and estimates that annual shortages in excess of 3,000 officers will persist through FY2013 unless accessions (the number of new lieutenants brought to active duty annually) can be increased and retention can be improved. It presently takes 10 years to \u201cgrow\u201d a major (from lieutenant to promotion to major), and 14 years if that major is an academy or ROTC graduate. Therefore, the projected shortage appears to be a significant long-term challenge especially as the Army continues to transform and maintain a significant role in fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT).\nThis report analyzes a number of potential factors contributing to the shortfall, especially the impact of reduced officer accessions during and after the Army personnel drawdown of the early 1990s, and the significant increase in Army officer requirements caused by the Army force structure transformation to a modular, brigade-centric force through its Modular Force Initiative. At this time, the high deployment tempo associated with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) does not appear to be associated with these shortfalls.\nAlthough the Army has already introduced several new programs to enhance officer retention, other possible options exist that could help address the Army\u2019s officer shortages. They include the possibility of officer retention bonuses. The Army does not pay any officer continuation or retention bonuses, with the exception of Aviation Career Incentive Pay.\nThis report will be updated as necessary.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
  ]
}