{ "id": "RL33607", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL33607", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 317652, "date": "2006-08-11", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T18:52:55.362029", "title": "U.S. Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence: A China Case Study", "summary": "Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse over the\nfuture direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. In the past, these discussions\nhave focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional military forces, with\ndiscussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense\nReview (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in the QDR's history. This\nindicates that analysts both inside and outside government are beginning to review and assess the\npotential deterrent and operational relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons.\n It appears that considerable pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and force\nstructure decisions with cost-effectiveness in mind. A key question for contemporary defense\nplanners is what proportion of U.S. military capabilities should be focused on traditional military\nchallenges and what proportion should be focused on non-traditional challenges, such as \"irregular,\ndisruptive and catastrophic\" threats?\n To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some argue\nthat we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies. A possible conflict with China\nattracts considerable attention from defense planners because it is a regional competitor today and\ncould over time grow to be a \"near-peer\" competitor. Analysts can also easily identify flashpoints\nwhere the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defend national interests.\n The analysis that follows seeks to explore the possible role that U.S. nuclear and conventional\nforces might play in four stages of potential conflicts: deterrence, prior to the start of the conflict;\ncrisis stability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of the conflict; and\nwar termination, through either a negotiated settlement or a battlefield victory. This report\nhighlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoing\ndebate regarding military investments. For example, this report suggests that nuclear and\nconventional military capabilities can simultaneously have positive effects on deterrence or\nwarfighting and negative effects on crisis stability or war termination objectives. Therefore, changes\nin military force structure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, should consider\npotential effects on crisis stability, for example. Further, investments in military capabilities that\nmay positively contribute to all potential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability,\nwarfighting, and war termination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on the\npotential range of conflict. This report will not be updated.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL33607", "sha1": "fe7fa229a44c8965c20bc9fcb2305981caa18c1b", "filename": "files/20060811_RL33607_fe7fa229a44c8965c20bc9fcb2305981caa18c1b.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL33607", "sha1": "6e480bc1d79edf2c368a8c32675bfdc695f8f664", "filename": "files/20060811_RL33607_6e480bc1d79edf2c368a8c32675bfdc695f8f664.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }