{ "id": "RL33733", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL33733", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 413130, "date": "2011-12-19", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T00:24:18.086403", "title": "Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?", "summary": "National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. They represent the most formal assessment of a given national security issue by the U.S. intelligence community. The intelligence process, however, is not an exact science and, on occasion, NIEs have proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This was demonstrated in the NIE produced in 2002 on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, parts of which were significantly inaccurate. \nAt best NIEs provide an in-depth understanding of a complex international situation where U.S. policymakers may perceive a need to make difficult decisions. Although NIEs can provide insights into the likely effects of certain policy approaches, they are not usually prepared to take into account the details of planned U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, or legislative initiatives. \nTraditionally, Congress has not been a principal consumer of NIEs. Although Congress has on occasion requested NIEs and expressed interest in their conclusions, the experience with the NIE on Iraqi WMD and other assessments has led some Members to question their usefulness. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364, \u00a71213) specifically requested a comprehensive NIE on Iran. The NIE was to be prepared in classified form and an unclassified summary of key judgments forwarded, \u201cconsistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.\u201d In early December 2007 the DNI released unclassified key judgments of a NIE, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The NIE judged \u201cwith high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.\u201d Even though the NIE did recognize \u201cwith moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons,\u201d the public release of the key judgments at a time of ongoing diplomatic initiatives was widely considered problematical.\nThere seems to be an emerging consensus that publicly releasing NIEs, or even unclassified summaries, has limitations. Some of the nuances of classified intelligence judgments are lost and there are concerns that public release of an unclassified summary of a complicated situation does not effectively serve the legislative process. In passing the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84), Congress chose not to require an NIE on the nuclear ambitions of certain states and non-state actors, but rather to request biennial reports (with unclassified summaries) from the DNI. Similarly, the FY2012 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1540, passed by both chambers in December 2011, requires a report on Russian nuclear forces to be prepared by the Secretary of Defense \u201cin coordination with the Director of National Intelligence.\u201d", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL33733", "sha1": "bb79ce725aae5ff2334ce06ca85283eb7631adca", "filename": "files/20111219_RL33733_bb79ce725aae5ff2334ce06ca85283eb7631adca.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL33733", "sha1": "4fc19869621d1582c77e2ea18058ec135c4bf9b9", "filename": "files/20111219_RL33733_4fc19869621d1582c77e2ea18058ec135c4bf9b9.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc491165/", "id": "RL33733_2011Jan06", "date": "2011-01-06", "retrieved": "2015-01-27T19:40:46", "title": "Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?", "summary": "This report discusses the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) that represent the highest and most formal level of strategic analysis by the U.S. intelligence community.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20110106_RL33733_0c84f497c7ec6c5a809d2dc19a6fbdf17cf8f3f1.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20110106_RL33733_0c84f497c7ec6c5a809d2dc19a6fbdf17cf8f3f1.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Intelligence activities", "name": "Intelligence activities" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Intelligence services", "name": "Intelligence services" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Espionage", "name": "Espionage" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc31416/", "id": "RL33733_2010Nov24", "date": "2010-11-24", "retrieved": "2011-03-09T09:26:47", "title": "Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?", "summary": "National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are often of considerable interest to many Members of Congress. NIEs address issues of major national security importance which may require congressional action. However, NIEs have occasionally proved unreliable because they were based on insufficient evidence or contained faulty analysis. This report explores this issue and discusses the NIE process and its relevance to congressional policymaking.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20101124_RL33733_49651fc0215541026e19b14e1f0df6fd48642c7f.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20101124_RL33733_49651fc0215541026e19b14e1f0df6fd48642c7f.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Intelligence activities", "name": "Intelligence activities" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Intelligence services", "name": "Intelligence services" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc810115/", "id": "RL33733_2008Jan28", "date": "2008-01-28", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20080128_RL33733_e2cf77186b2912064d0698c5d14c2cc1b3eab7fc.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20080128_RL33733_e2cf77186b2912064d0698c5d14c2cc1b3eab7fc.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc810798/", "id": "RL33733_2006Nov21", "date": "2006-11-21", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress?", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20061121_RL33733_89eb41d71e1798e88237a750bbd3bb1b5666cf7d.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20061121_RL33733_89eb41d71e1798e88237a750bbd3bb1b5666cf7d.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }