{ "id": "RL34544", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL34544", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 611943, "date": "2019-12-20", "retrieved": "2020-01-02T13:33:56.037730", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.\nIs Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons?\nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. \nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nWho Is Monitoring Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program?\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and Resolution 2231. Iran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nHow Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon?\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "3db211b6a08171f7f07159300c4b74c2ef4f5c80", "filename": "files/20191220_RL34544_3db211b6a08171f7f07159300c4b74c2ef4f5c80.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "b03e647f49530b7db06cc374dee64fc6946d4b27", "filename": "files/20191220_RL34544_b03e647f49530b7db06cc374dee64fc6946d4b27.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 606062, "date": "2019-10-09", "retrieved": "2019-10-10T22:15:43.588828", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.\nIs Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons?\nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. \nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nWho Is Monitoring Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program?\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and Resolution 2231. Iran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nHow Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon?\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "2383c80237ecae0fd216b413e9882c02b6891d35", "filename": "files/20191009_RL34544_2383c80237ecae0fd216b413e9882c02b6891d35.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "943e3becb89a8cf0551a43a98509f7efceb07aad", "filename": "files/20191009_RL34544_943e3becb89a8cf0551a43a98509f7efceb07aad.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 598038, "date": "2019-05-10", "retrieved": "2019-05-10T22:19:03.366556", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.\nIs Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons?\nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. \nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nWho Is Monitoring Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program?\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and Resolution 2231. Iran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nHow Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon?\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "fcef51e08c52cbcc82f47fc33a4238c7f1f7dab7", "filename": "files/20190510_RL34544_fcef51e08c52cbcc82f47fc33a4238c7f1f7dab7.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "74b9823ccd8d44a16f0fcc16a109591c8c8eb986", "filename": "files/20190510_RL34544_74b9823ccd8d44a16f0fcc16a109591c8c8eb986.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 595470, "date": "2019-04-01", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T13:49:07.114300", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.\nIs Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons?\nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. \nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nWho Is Monitoring Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program?\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and Resolution 2231. Iran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nHow Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon?\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "70ea3d0fd20c73b9b8e20c727c8d05b6a96b5d1d", "filename": "files/20190401_RL34544_70ea3d0fd20c73b9b8e20c727c8d05b6a96b5d1d.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "73a01543ddaecde0eab55b5a87fb9c1db0b18f25", "filename": "files/20190401_RL34544_73a01543ddaecde0eab55b5a87fb9c1db0b18f25.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 585535, "date": "2018-09-19", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:22:16.804003", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. \nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and resolution. \nIran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "8fbe6e3d958ab32f7665acf0a84ad62be6cd8cb4", "filename": "files/20180919_RL34544_8fbe6e3d958ab32f7665acf0a84ad62be6cd8cb4.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "c626dd81512d690474a4a0dfb1188e263f598fb4", "filename": "files/20180919_RL34544_c626dd81512d690474a4a0dfb1188e263f598fb4.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584053, "date": "2018-08-09", "retrieved": "2018-08-27T15:07:06.146474", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. \nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and resolution. \nIran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "06577431018f176caa05cdd69a5307ce084e9ebe", "filename": "files/20180809_RL34544_06577431018f176caa05cdd69a5307ce084e9ebe.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "d54012aa9ef2b536b96cf6fd7a0b27dacec6b34a", "filename": "files/20180809_RL34544_d54012aa9ef2b536b96cf6fd7a0b27dacec6b34a.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 460807, "date": "2017-04-27", "retrieved": "2017-05-09T15:02:36.187111", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. \nThe United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that \u201c[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.\u201d \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. \nIran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nThen Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to Clapper\u2019s February 2016 testimony. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "5f0a1ef936c616ff225d6fe6ee6c98abaff9624d", "filename": "files/20170427_RL34544_5f0a1ef936c616ff225d6fe6ee6c98abaff9624d.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "b8d3c722f5817ad3a99b693425d224f4a4146fdd", "filename": "files/20170427_RL34544_b8d3c722f5817ad3a99b693425d224f4a4146fdd.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 458180, "date": "2016-11-30", "retrieved": "2017-01-13T15:47:26.970197", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. \nThe United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that \u201c[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.\u201d \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. \nIran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nThen Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to Clapper\u2019s February 2016 testimony. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "c7f4bb6b8801092194e4cc490ef571ef9dd40fa8", "filename": "files/20161130_RL34544_c7f4bb6b8801092194e4cc490ef571ef9dd40fa8.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "75a78d1e15ce406b413cae60fbb287f9b894d742", "filename": "files/20161130_RL34544_75a78d1e15ce406b413cae60fbb287f9b894d742.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 453393, "date": "2016-06-13", "retrieved": "2016-11-28T22:05:32.188076", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. \nThe United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that \u201c[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.\u201d \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \u201cP5+1\u201d), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA\u2019s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions\u2019 requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. \nIran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA\u2019s \u201cfinal assessment on the resolution\u201d of these outstanding issues.\nThen Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran\u2019s compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to Clapper\u2019s testimony. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "040df6b0bded2ccc14388c98f850375ba0148499", "filename": "files/20160613_RL34544_040df6b0bded2ccc14388c98f850375ba0148499.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "8ec956619a151806ac0b758480f9bce33ae7d16e", "filename": "files/20160613_RL34544_8ec956619a151806ac0b758480f9bce33ae7d16e.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 423525, "date": "2012-10-17", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T21:40:05.143207", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "Iran\u2019s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran\u2019s construction of gas centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. \nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of August 2012, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically produce enough HEU for several nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing up to 20% uranium-235, but, as of August 2012, this amount was not sufficient to yield a sufficient amount of weapons-grade HEU for a weapon.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council has responded to Iran\u2019s refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continues to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. \nTehran has also continued work on a heavy-water reactor, which is a proliferation concern because its spent fuel will contain plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \u201creprocessing.\u201d Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities and has been able to verify that Tehran\u2019s declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. But the agency still has concerns about the program, particularly evidence that Iran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. The United States has assessed that Tehran has the technical capability eventually to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. \nWhether Iran has a nuclear weapons program is also unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran \u201chalted its nuclear weapons program\u201d in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \u201ckeeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\u201d and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \u201cinherently reversible.\u201d U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. For example, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in January 2012 that Iran \u201cis keeping open the option to develop\u201d nuclear weapons. \nSecretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in January 2012 that Iran would probably need \u201cabout a year\u201d to produce a nuclear weapon and \u201cpossibly another one to two years\u201d to incorporate it into a delivery vehicle. However, Director Clapper indicated in February 2012 that it would likely take Iran longer than a year to produce a nuclear weapon after making a decision to do so. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL34544", "sha1": "8c09e0a24d05bd90174a719a2a3008157f58ad96", "filename": "files/20121017_RL34544_8c09e0a24d05bd90174a719a2a3008157f58ad96.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL34544", "sha1": "0073d58f9a380be46822ce55d3033adda9de2750", "filename": "files/20121017_RL34544_0073d58f9a380be46822ce55d3033adda9de2750.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 3227, "name": "Proliferation and Arms Control" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc815621/", "id": "RL34544_2012Sep26", "date": "2012-09-26", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Iran\u2019s Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20120926_RL34544_9e3d007620918e23c2c0e586cd71dca31528a362.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20120926_RL34544_9e3d007620918e23c2c0e586cd71dca31528a362.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc626983/", "id": "RL34544_2009Dec29", "date": "2009-12-29", "retrieved": "2015-06-15T14:46:40", "title": "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "This report looks at the background of Iran's nuclear policy. It covers the current status of Iran's nuclear facilities, and current controversy surrounding them, as well as the effects of international sanctions on Iran, recent sabotages on the Iran Enrichment Program, an estimated timeline of Iran's nuclear weapon capabilities, and whether or not Iran even has a nuclear weapons program.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20091229_RL34544_7980f5e7f7dad8c5b5623e18558b7b5343c4efb0.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20091229_RL34544_7980f5e7f7dad8c5b5623e18558b7b5343c4efb0.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Iran -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Iran -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Iran", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Iran" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear energy", "name": "Nuclear energy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons", "name": "Nuclear weapons" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons information", "name": "Nuclear weapons information" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc627074/", "id": "RL34544_2009Nov25", "date": "2009-11-25", "retrieved": "2015-06-15T14:46:40", "title": "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status", "summary": "This report looks at the background of Iran's nuclear policy. 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