{
  "id": "RS21369",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RS21369",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 103152,
      "date": "2002-12-13",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:01:41.875941",
      "title": "Synthetic Poliovirus: Bioterrorism and Science Policy Implications",
      "summary": "In July 2002, an online scientific journal published a report describing how to make the virus that\ncauses polio from mail-ordered pieces of DNA. This sparked widespread concern that the same\nprocess could be used by terrorists to make this or other biological agents. Most bioterrorism experts\nagree that it would be much easier, cheaper, and quicker to obtain most such agents from naturally\noccurring sources. Smallpox and Ebola are frequently cited as exceptions; however, these agents\nwould be significantly more difficult to synthesize than poliovirus. To limit the threat posed by this\ntype of research, policymakers have discussed approaches that include: increasing oversight of the\nDNA suppliers, limiting access to the genetic information of select pathogens, and regulating the\npublishing of information deemed possibly helpful to terrorists. This report will be updated as\nevents warrant.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21369",
          "sha1": "88968ab6a1432f8b960f205c3710314df6cf3830",
          "filename": "files/20021213_RS21369_88968ab6a1432f8b960f205c3710314df6cf3830.pdf",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "filename": "files/20021213_RS21369_88968ab6a1432f8b960f205c3710314df6cf3830.html"
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "Science and Technology Policy"
  ]
}