{ "id": "RS21534", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "RS", "number": "RS21534", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "retrieved": "2024-05-21T04:03:40.549239", "id": "RS21534_119_2024-04-17", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2024-04-17_RS21534_45b1eed25fe8ed8bf2da6bc3f311d19a69afc08a.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534/119", "sha1": "45b1eed25fe8ed8bf2da6bc3f311d19a69afc08a" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2024-04-17_RS21534_45b1eed25fe8ed8bf2da6bc3f311d19a69afc08a.html" } ], "date": "2024-04-17", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "RS", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RS21534", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "retrieved": "2024-05-21T04:03:40.547944", "id": "RS21534_117_2023-03-02", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2023-03-02_RS21534_ce5e7f4e9d9bed1bde8cb01ad2e567622c86efb8.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534/117", "sha1": "ce5e7f4e9d9bed1bde8cb01ad2e567622c86efb8" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2023-03-02_RS21534_ce5e7f4e9d9bed1bde8cb01ad2e567622c86efb8.html" } ], "date": "2023-03-02", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "RS", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RS21534", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "retrieved": "2024-05-21T04:03:40.545601", "id": "RS21534_114_2022-06-01", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2022-06-01_RS21534_72bd51a9a2b82bf8327928ae88c09e20c0385147.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534/114", "sha1": "72bd51a9a2b82bf8327928ae88c09e20c0385147" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2022-06-01_RS21534_72bd51a9a2b82bf8327928ae88c09e20c0385147.html" } ], "date": "2022-06-01", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "RS", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RS21534", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "retrieved": "2024-05-21T04:03:40.543581", "id": "RS21534_111_2021-05-19", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2021-05-19_RS21534_9a5dec74edb1ab3aac1c33791e8bb7744464d3ef.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534/111", "sha1": "9a5dec74edb1ab3aac1c33791e8bb7744464d3ef" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-05-19_RS21534_9a5dec74edb1ab3aac1c33791e8bb7744464d3ef.html" } ], "date": "2021-05-19", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "RS", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RS21534", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "retrieved": "2024-05-21T04:03:40.541834", "id": "RS21534_109_2020-06-17", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2020-06-17_RS21534_5bd38acdfe7d1daa3d3e772c17d901b3725048eb.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534/109", "sha1": "5bd38acdfe7d1daa3d3e772c17d901b3725048eb" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2020-06-17_RS21534_5bd38acdfe7d1daa3d3e772c17d901b3725048eb.html" } ], "date": "2020-06-17", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "RS", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RS21534", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 614843, "date": "2020-01-27", "retrieved": "2020-01-28T23:19:48.865551", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic partner of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and related regional threats. The January 2020 death of Oman\u2019s longtime leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, is unlikely to alter U.S.-Oman ties or Oman\u2019s regional policies. His successor, Haythim bin Tariq Al Said, a cousin selected by Oman\u2019s royal family immediately upon the Sultan\u2019s death, espouses policies similar to those of Qaboos. \nDuring Qaboos\u2019 reign (1970-2020), Oman generally avoided joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions, instead seeking to mediate their resolution. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad\u2019s regime. It opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE-led isolation of Qatar and did not join a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015. \nThere has been a consensus among Oman\u2019s leaders that engaging Iran is preferable to confrontation. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing reimposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran\u2019s efforts to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Omani leaders for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but did not significantly limit the Sultan\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities, produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs apparently helped calm unrest. As have the other GCC states since the 2011 Arab uprisings, Oman has increased press censorship and arrested some critics who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only modest resources and has sought to attract foreign investment, including to fund the major development of Al Duqm port. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance focused primarily on building capacity of Oman\u2019s counterterrorism and border and maritime security authorities.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "563b23bdd24625657afbc6a2784aae3627d494e4", "filename": "files/20200127_RS21534_563b23bdd24625657afbc6a2784aae3627d494e4.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20200127_RS21534_images_d4c0364b19fd31322114148bc1b67f5a014acd75.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/1.png": "files/20200127_RS21534_images_91ff61ecc19c91b11b0d1c9bf26f8208a9e9b9c7.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "8a2bf972800d6a8c9be2e67443ed134524457b75", "filename": "files/20200127_RS21534_8a2bf972800d6a8c9be2e67443ed134524457b75.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 606524, "date": "2019-10-17", "retrieved": "2019-10-23T22:18:15.121527", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic partner of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter terrorist groups and related regional threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos\u2019 frail appearance in public appearance has fueled speculation about succession, but he does continue to meet with visiting leaders. He received Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, for the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years. \nOman has tended to position itself as a mediator of regional conflicts, and generally avoids joining other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad\u2019s regime. It opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE-led isolation of Qatar and did not join a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015. \nOmani leaders have historically asserted that engaging Iran is preferable to confrontation.. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing reimposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran\u2019s efforts to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs apparently helped calm the unrest. As have the other GCC states since the 2011 Arab uprisings, Oman has increased press censorship and arrested some critics who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only modest resources and has sought to attract foreign investment, including to fund the major development of Al Duqm port. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance focused primarily on building capacity of Oman\u2019s counter-terrorism and border and maritime security authorities.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "23034cf3cd620b229c95cd4aba5ffc9bf298e575", "filename": "files/20191017_RS21534_23034cf3cd620b229c95cd4aba5ffc9bf298e575.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191017_RS21534_images_d4c0364b19fd31322114148bc1b67f5a014acd75.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191017_RS21534_images_4de307d08de59f3c45358e92380c0f6fb6ced71e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "db42a2404229a83df6f00f3c4931ce8f1238d66d", "filename": "files/20191017_RS21534_db42a2404229a83df6f00f3c4931ce8f1238d66d.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 601937, "date": "2019-07-08", "retrieved": "2019-07-11T22:21:58.637022", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad during 2014-2015, and his frail appearance in public appearance fuels speculation about succession. He does continue to meet with visiting leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years. \nOman has tended to position itself as a mediator of regional conflicts, and generally avoids joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions such as that in Yemen. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad\u2019s regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar. \nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing reimposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran\u2019s efforts to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs helped calm the unrest. As have the other GCC states since the 2011 Arab uprisings, Oman has increased press censorship and arrested some critics who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only modest resources and has sought to attract foreign investment, such as for the major development project at Al Duqm. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "a0b35f1f279e7e522f3aa6531ae0fc4c4c53c570", "filename": "files/20190708_RS21534_a0b35f1f279e7e522f3aa6531ae0fc4c4c53c570.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190708_RS21534_images_402927637a1d5ff8b094a3ae821074c93bfce316.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190708_RS21534_images_4de307d08de59f3c45358e92380c0f6fb6ced71e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "b8f6ead2b6372dba38805d6dc7355d6adfc88cd3", "filename": "files/20190708_RS21534_b8f6ead2b6372dba38805d6dc7355d6adfc88cd3.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 595107, "date": "2019-03-28", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T13:51:27.527715", "title": "Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad during 2014-2015, and his frail appearance in public appearance fuels speculation about succession. He does continue to meet with visiting leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years. \nOman has tended to position itself as a mediator of regional conflicts, and generally avoids joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions such as that in Yemen. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad\u2019s regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar. \nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing re-imposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran\u2019s efforts to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs helped calm the unrest. Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states since 2011 by increasing press censorship and arresting critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "62c9d935fd1b98417c5f82b0925a94918c893de4", "filename": "files/20190328_RS21534_62c9d935fd1b98417c5f82b0925a94918c893de4.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190328_RS21534_images_402927637a1d5ff8b094a3ae821074c93bfce316.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190328_RS21534_images_4de307d08de59f3c45358e92380c0f6fb6ced71e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "0a93171a767a0b8d3827d6e338a7eaf45bfd33da", "filename": "files/20190328_RS21534_0a93171a767a0b8d3827d6e338a7eaf45bfd33da.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 589935, "date": "2019-01-17", "retrieved": "2019-01-18T15:25:25.134779", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-2015, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. Although appearing frail, he hosted the surprise visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional interventions, instead attempting to mediate regional conflicts. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad\u2019s regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar. \nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing reimposed U.S. sanctions as of 2018 and with taking steps to block Iran\u2019s efforts to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The apparent public thirst for additional political reform\u2014as well as the inadequate employment opportunities\u2014produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but the popularity of Qaboos and government commitments to create jobs helped prevent more sustained unrest. Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states since 2011 by increasing press censorship and arresting critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "7dbe14ec6f35313fbad111c39cdbb661e9ffe955", "filename": "files/20190117_RS21534_7dbe14ec6f35313fbad111c39cdbb661e9ffe955.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190117_RS21534_images_402927637a1d5ff8b094a3ae821074c93bfce316.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190117_RS21534_images_4de307d08de59f3c45358e92380c0f6fb6ced71e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "bc6a29fc253f307fa158f0c9fda9c473e887e277", "filename": "files/20190117_RS21534_bc6a29fc253f307fa158f0c9fda9c473e887e277.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 589864, "date": "2019-01-11", "retrieved": "2019-01-16T23:13:41.592667", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-2015, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. Although appearing frail, he hosted the surprise visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional interventions, instead attempting to mediate regional conflicts. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad\u2019s regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar. \nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing reimposed U.S. sanctions as of 2018 and with taking steps to block Iran\u2019s efforts to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The apparent public thirst for additional political reform\u2014as well as the inadequate employment opportunities\u2014produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but the popularity of Qaboos and government commitments to create jobs helped prevent more sustained unrest. Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states since 2011 by increasing press censorship and arresting critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "90e3773ae2bdb1e25f68f27b5e5f8fb02e227a24", "filename": "files/20190111_RS21534_90e3773ae2bdb1e25f68f27b5e5f8fb02e227a24.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190111_RS21534_images_060517446b25bbaf11f1ac45c73a1faa9c6bea00.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190111_RS21534_images_4de307d08de59f3c45358e92380c0f6fb6ced71e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "53eb7b11e2369cb0abf30486059bb2930a62de1d", "filename": "files/20190111_RS21534_53eb7b11e2369cb0abf30486059bb2930a62de1d.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 587468, "date": "2018-11-09", "retrieved": "2018-11-15T14:12:35.977480", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-2015, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. He appeared frail while hosting a surprise visit made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership in more than 20 years. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional interventions, instead serving as an intermediary to try to resolve regional conflicts. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015. Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar. \nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran reportedly has taken advantage of its relationship with Oman to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to an Iran ally, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The apparent public thirst for additional political reform\u2014as well as the inadequate employment opportunities\u2014produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018. Still, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos and government commitments to advance reform and create jobs have helped prevent more sustained unrest. And, Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting activist critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "ef720defb7c6df66ead1187811c4d961ed7ab0b0", "filename": "files/20181109_RS21534_ef720defb7c6df66ead1187811c4d961ed7ab0b0.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20181109_RS21534_images_060517446b25bbaf11f1ac45c73a1faa9c6bea00.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "24c22a42c3fd2411631bacf564db9772132c4f28", "filename": "files/20181109_RS21534_24c22a42c3fd2411631bacf564db9772132c4f28.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584810, "date": "2018-08-30", "retrieved": "2018-09-12T22:22:00.561520", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-2015, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional interventions, instead serving as an intermediary to try to resolve regional conflicts. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is has not contributed military force to that effort. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition until one year after that grouping was formed in December 2015. Oman opposed the Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar in June 2017. \nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran reportedly has taken advantage of its relationship with Oman to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to an Iran ally, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation, but does not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The apparent public thirst for additional political reform\u2014as well as the inadequate employment opportunities\u2014produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018. Still, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos and government commitments to advance reform and create jobs have helped prevent more sustained unrest. And, Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting activist critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "1973cf6b1385c8d32928678f1288f3e2509696c8", "filename": "files/20180830_RS21534_1973cf6b1385c8d32928678f1288f3e2509696c8.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180830_RS21534_images_060517446b25bbaf11f1ac45c73a1faa9c6bea00.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "f7fc5e8e4add8e89f010e8cf736199bbc65bf84e", "filename": "files/20180830_RS21534_f7fc5e8e4add8e89f010e8cf736199bbc65bf84e.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 582197, "date": "2018-06-20", "retrieved": "2018-06-22T13:08:40.159798", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf states to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-2015, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional interventions. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is has not contributed military force to that effort. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition until one year after that grouping was formed in December 2015. Oman opposed the Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar in June 2017. Oman has consistently endorsed U.S.-brokered regional peace agreements, and Oman has sometimes hosted Israeli leaders.\nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran reportedly has taken advantage of its relationship with Oman to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to an Iran ally, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The slow pace of political reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s failure to create an adequate number of new jobs\u2014produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018. Still, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos and government commitments to advance reform and create jobs have helped prevent more sustained unrest. And, Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting activist critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic unrest over a lack of job opportunities demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty diversifying its economy and coping with the fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. foreign assistance.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "268edbbfc26e946e06624ed8cb06571109342f8b", "filename": "files/20180620_RS21534_268edbbfc26e946e06624ed8cb06571109342f8b.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180620_RS21534_images_060517446b25bbaf11f1ac45c73a1faa9c6bea00.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "4ea3729622e7eb599d817f9ae9012d82f43f9ca2", "filename": "files/20180620_RS21534_4ea3729622e7eb599d817f9ae9012d82f43f9ca2.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 578969, "date": "2018-03-08", "retrieved": "2018-03-08T23:59:56.779733", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf states to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-2015, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition announced until one year after that grouping was formed in December 2015. Oman did not join the Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar in June 2017. Oman has consistently endorsed U.S.-brokered regional peace agreements, and senior Omani officials have sometimes met with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies.\nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran reportedly has taken advantage of its relationship with Oman to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to an Iran ally, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. The slow pace of political reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s failure to create an adequate number of new jobs\u2014produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018. Still, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos and government commitments to advance reform and create jobs have helped prevent more sustained unrest. And, Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting activist critics of the government who use social media. \nThe periodic unrest over a lack of job opportunities demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty diversifying its economy and coping with the fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014.Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. foreign assistance.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "cfb0eb211092bacc4fdf3591e36dcb2533e3f0e7", "filename": "files/20180308_RS21534_cfb0eb211092bacc4fdf3591e36dcb2533e3f0e7.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180308_RS21534_images_060517446b25bbaf11f1ac45c73a1faa9c6bea00.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "020261ca29ccea1dd87378a72e336598e7b3b0ab", "filename": "files/20180308_RS21534_020261ca29ccea1dd87378a72e336598e7b3b0ab.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576093, "date": "2017-12-04", "retrieved": "2017-12-05T13:52:28.742388", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf states to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-15, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts. Until December 2016, it had refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. Oman did not join the Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar in June 2017. Oman has consistently endorsed U.S.-brokered regional peace agreements reached and senior Omani officials have sometimes met with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies.\nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran reportedly has taken advantage of its relationship with Oman to ship weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to an Iran ally, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. However, since then, Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting activist critics of the government who use social media. \nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no U.S. economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "18d890e1d46ee33648a361aa049c269165086974", "filename": "files/20171204_RS21534_18d890e1d46ee33648a361aa049c269165086974.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171204_RS21534_images_060517446b25bbaf11f1ac45c73a1faa9c6bea00.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "76b4606f6c2853a4c4c461903e7cf9c668f9111c", "filename": "files/20171204_RS21534_76b4606f6c2853a4c4c461903e7cf9c668f9111c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 573451, "date": "2017-09-27", "retrieved": "2017-10-02T22:08:34.410167", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf states to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He underwent cancer treatment abroad for nearly a year during 2014-15, and appears in public rarely, fueling speculation about succession. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts. Until December 2016, it had refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. Oman did not join the Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar in June 2017. Oman has consistently endorsed U.S.-brokered regional peace agreements reached and senior Omani officials have sometimes met with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies.\nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). On the other hand, Iran reportedly is taking advantage of its relationship with Oman to smuggle weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to an Iran ally, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. However, since then, Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting activist critics of the government who use social media. \nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify. Oman receives minimal amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no U.S. economic aid.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "51c883ff99625490de82bbb5856f4e68586d9dfd", "filename": "files/20170927_RS21534_51c883ff99625490de82bbb5856f4e68586d9dfd.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170927_RS21534_images_2371409ae40f1f62120634212780e80bd88f2309.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "891b3d7d56597c0b4c2e77947ebfeceb6066fa2c", "filename": "files/20170927_RS21534_891b3d7d56597c0b4c2e77947ebfeceb6066fa2c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 462845, "date": "2017-07-25", "retrieved": "2017-08-22T13:46:08.104491", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf states to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and terrorist transit. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in March 2015 after nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but has appeared in public only rarely since, causing speculation about his health and succession. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts. Until December 2016, it had refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. Oman did not join the Saudi-led effort to isolate Qatar in June 2017. Oman has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies.\nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that ultimately produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). On the other hand, some reports indicate that Iran might be taking advantage of its relationship with Oman to smuggle weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to the Houthi rebels in Yemen that Iran is supporting. \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. However, since then, Oman has mimicked the policies of the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting critics who use social media. \nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the dramatic fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "885a745820d8841082ae71c89ce18ed3287e1ed6", "filename": "files/20170725_RS21534_885a745820d8841082ae71c89ce18ed3287e1ed6.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=RS/html/RS21534_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170725_RS21534_images_2371409ae40f1f62120634212780e80bd88f2309.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "b2c86550c2706b8d58b6c20a3fa7911f604ae4a7", "filename": "files/20170725_RS21534_b2c86550c2706b8d58b6c20a3fa7911f604ae4a7.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461069, "date": "2017-05-10", "retrieved": "2017-05-16T14:31:59.453649", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf states to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. The facilities access agreement represented an Omani shift from reliance on Britain for its security, although Oman and Britain continue to maintain close military ties. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and terrorist transit. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in March 2015 after nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but has appeared in public only rarely since, causing rampant speculation about his health and succession issues. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with the Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric in January 2016. Oman\u2019s ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran. Oman\u2019s diplomacy paved the way for U.S.-Iran direct talks that ultimately produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). On the other hand, some reports indicate that Iran might be taking advantage of its relationship with Oman to smuggle weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to the Houthi rebels in Yemen that Iran is supporting.\nOman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts. Until December 2016, it had delayed joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. Oman has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies.\nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. However, since then, Oman has mimicked the policies of the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting critics who use social media. \nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the dramatic fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "4e6d8007c4e5423b0e86e13fb39198334e72a915", "filename": "files/20170510_RS21534_4e6d8007c4e5423b0e86e13fb39198334e72a915.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "a3a5f64ead71d72524d830596ef064c5b3747a1a", "filename": "files/20170510_RS21534_a3a5f64ead71d72524d830596ef064c5b3747a1a.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 458038, "date": "2016-12-27", "retrieved": "2017-01-06T19:15:20.397211", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf monarchies to formally allow the U.S. military to use bases there. The facilities access accord represented a long-term Omani shift from reliance on Britain for its security, although Oman continues to maintain close military ties to Britain. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the transit of terrorists through regional waterways. Oman has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in March 2015 after nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but has rarely appeared in public since, causing rampant speculation about his health and succession issues. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and the country maintains close relations with Iran. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with the Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric in January 2016. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts and did not join a Saudi-led broad counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. On the other hand, some reports indicate that Iran might be taking advantage of its relationship with Oman to smuggle weapons across Oman\u2019s borders to the Houthi rebels in Yemen that Iran is supporting.\nOman\u2019s ties to Iran has enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran. Oman\u2019s diplomacy paved the way for U.S.-Iran direct talks that ultimately produced the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (\u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u201d (JCPOA)). \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decision maker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. The apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside in 2012. However, since then, Oman has mimicked the policies of the other GCC states in increasing press censorship and arresting critics who use social media. \nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the dramatic fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "8445fd6aabe83b1c9b88af1b1433fee9c4e05814", "filename": "files/20161227_RS21534_8445fd6aabe83b1c9b88af1b1433fee9c4e05814.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "7513e58d234798c7810d7a9dab420adb622558fc", "filename": "files/20161227_RS21534_7513e58d234798c7810d7a9dab420adb622558fc.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 455804, "date": "2016-09-15", "retrieved": "2016-09-16T18:02:14.157458", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf monarchies to formally allow the U.S. military to uses bases there. The facilities access accord represented a long-term Omani shift from reliance on Britain for its security, although Oman continues to maintain close military ties to Britain. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the transit of terrorists through regional waterways. Oman has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in March 2015 after nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but he rarely appears in public, causing rampant speculation about his health and succession issues. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and Sultan Qaboos and his aides have consistently maintained ties to Iran\u2019s leaders. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with the Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric in January 2016. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts and did not join a Saudi-led broad counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. Oman also has been a broker for the United States and Iran, in the absence of formal diplomatic U.S.-Iran relations, to resolve some bilateral and multilateral issues, such as Iran\u2019s holding of U.S. citizens. Oman\u2019s diplomacy helped pave the way for the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community that ultimately translated into the July 14, 2015, \u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u201d (JCPOA). \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. However, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside by early 2012.\nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the dramatic fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) is intended to facilitate Oman\u2019s access to the large U.S. economy and thereby accelerate Oman\u2019s efforts to diversify.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "59ed1de8b6f57b43b204088dd7a688922ae2f207", "filename": "files/20160915_RS21534_59ed1de8b6f57b43b204088dd7a688922ae2f207.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "fe968370106cee4d85a68daffa0b66a074595489", "filename": "files/20160915_RS21534_fe968370106cee4d85a68daffa0b66a074595489.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 282, "name": "Middle East and North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 454180, "date": "2016-07-11", "retrieved": "2016-09-09T19:13:25.137443", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf monarchies to formally allow the U.S. military to uses bases there. The facilities access accord represented a long-term Omani shift from reliance on Britain for its security, although Oman continues to maintain close military ties to Britain. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the transit of terrorists through regional waterways. Oman has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies. It was partly in appreciation for Oman\u2019s support that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy and compensate for its lack of large reserves of crude oil. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in March 2015 after nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but he rarely appears in public, causing speculation about his health. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to avoid joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts. Oman has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and Sultan Qaboos and his aides have consistently maintained ties to Iran\u2019s leaders. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with the Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric in January 2016. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts and did not join a Saudi-led broad counterterrorism coalition announced in December 2015. Oman also has been a broker for the United States and Iran, in the absence of formal diplomatic U.S.-Iran relations, to resolve some bilateral and multilateral issues, such as Iran\u2019s holding of U.S. citizens. Oman\u2019s diplomacy helped pave the way for the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community that ultimately translated into the July 14, 2015, \u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u201d (JCPOA). \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis, because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. However, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside by early 2012.\nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the dramatic fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014, which has accelerated GCC efforts to try to diversify their economies. Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "544a325a2d9b636c14589717496fce923e6f8076", "filename": "files/20160711_RS21534_544a325a2d9b636c14589717496fce923e6f8076.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "9537743446931d438698ea92a178d81e95e6cf63", "filename": "files/20160711_RS21534_9537743446931d438698ea92a178d81e95e6cf63.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 282, "name": "Middle East and North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 452069, "date": "2016-04-26", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T19:17:02.265941", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first of the Persian Gulf monarchies to formally allow the U.S. military to uses bases there. The facilities access accord represented a long-term Omani shift from reliance on Britain for its security, although Oman continues to maintain close military ties to Britain. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the transit of terrorists through regional waterways. Oman has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders, even when doing so ran counter to the policies of Oman\u2019s Gulf state allies. It was partly in appreciation for Oman\u2019s support that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy and compensate for its lack of large reserves of crude oil. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in March 2015 after nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but his public appearances are rare. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended not to join its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in direct intervention in regional conflicts such as in Syria and Yemen, instead developing ties to regional leaders and factions. Oman has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country, and Sultan Qaboos and his aides have consistently maintained ties to Iran\u2019s leaders. Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with the Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric in January 2016. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts and did not join a Saudi-led broad counterterrorism coalition announced by Riyadh in December 2015. Oman also has been a broker for the United States and Iran, in the absence of formal diplomatic U.S.-Iran relations, to resolve some bilateral and multilateral issues, such as Iran\u2019s holding of U.S. citizens. Oman\u2019s diplomacy helped pave the way for the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community that ultimately became the July 14, 2015, \u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u201d (JCPOA). \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States repeatedly praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decisionmaker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. However, the apparent domestic popularity of Qaboos, coupled with additional economic and political reforms as well as repression of protest actions, caused the unrest to subside by early 2012.\nAs are the other GCC states, Oman is attempting to cope with the dramatic fall in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. However, Oman\u2019s economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states that apparently rely almost entirely on oil exports to generate government revenue.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RS21534", "sha1": "6d78d0b6479d727c328bbe8981c87a61f0009f8a", "filename": "files/20160426_RS21534_6d78d0b6479d727c328bbe8981c87a61f0009f8a.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RS21534", "sha1": "bb3a384475d152d757c20200c0b22011939d1c25", "filename": "files/20160426_RS21534_bb3a384475d152d757c20200c0b22011939d1c25.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 282, "name": "Middle East and North Africa" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 449515, "date": "2016-02-05", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T17:16:48.441695", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980 when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal agreement allowing U.S. use of its military facilities. It has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since then. Oman is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter the transit of terrorists through the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and it has consistently supported U.S. Middle East peacemaking efforts by publicly endorsing peace agreements reached and meeting with Israeli leaders. It was partly in appreciation for this alliance that the United States entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman, which is also intended to help Oman diversify its economy and compensate for its lack of large reserves of crude oil. Oman\u2019s ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen if its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa\u2019id Al Said, leaves the scene in the near term. He returned to Oman in late March 2015 after undergoing nearly a year of treatment in Germany, but his public appearances since have been rare. \nWithin the region, Oman has tended to take a cautious approach\u2014hesitating to be drawn into regional conflicts directly but instead developing ties to many different leaders and factions in order to be able to mediate solutions to these conflicts. Unlike most of its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman), Oman asserts that engaging Iran directly is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. Sultan Qaboos and his aides have consistently maintained ties to Iran\u2019s leaders, positioning Oman to mediate on the Syria and Yemen conflicts\u2014arenas in which other GCC states are actively working against proxies and allies of Iran. To preserve its ties to Iran as well as its GCC allies, Oman has refrained from any intervention in the Syria civil war, it has not joined the Saudi-led coalition that is undertaking military action against the Zaidi Shiite \u201cHouthi\u201d rebels in Yemen, and it did not downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with the Saudi-Iran dispute over the Saudi execution of a Shiite cleric in January 2016. Oman has publicly joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization but it is apparently not participating militarily in those efforts and did not join a Saudi-led broad counterterrorism coalition announced by Riyadh in December 2015. \nOman has been a broker for the United States and Iran, in the absence of formal diplomatic U.S.-Iran relations, to resolve some bilateral and multilateral issues. An August 2013 visit to Iran by Qaboos, which followed months and possibly years of quiet U.S.-Iran diplomacy brokered by Oman, helped pave the way for the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community. Some of the talks that led to the July 14, 2015, \u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action\u201d (JCPOA) with Iran were held in Oman, and Oman has hosted subsequent U.S.-Iran discussions on the implementation of that agreement. Oman facilitated the September 2011 release of two U.S. hikers from Iran after two years in jail there, and it reportedly has been involved in efforts to obtain the release of other U.S. citizens imprisoned in Iran or in territory under Iran\u2019s control. \nPrior to the wave of Middle East unrest that began in 2011, the United States repeatedly praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allowed Omanis a measure of representation, but did not significantly limit Qaboos\u2019s role as paramount decision-maker. Modest reform\u2014as well as the country\u2019s economic performance\u2014apparently did not satisfy some Omanis because unprecedented protests took place in several Omani cities for much of 2011. 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U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc816955/", "id": "RS21534_2015Mar12", "date": "2015-03-12", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20150312_RS21534_13f43dbcb085cbd7f28232ee504cf17d4da1ab0c.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20150312_RS21534_13f43dbcb085cbd7f28232ee504cf17d4da1ab0c.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462347/", "id": "RS21534_2014Jul07", "date": "2014-07-07", "retrieved": "2014-12-05T09:57:41", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "This report describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140707_RS21534_373ce4d6564b8a0beb0f6734933b1245b10aff0d.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140707_RS21534_373ce4d6564b8a0beb0f6734933b1245b10aff0d.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- 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"id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc272124/", "id": "RS21534_2013Dec27", "date": "2013-12-27", "retrieved": "2014-02-03T19:46:03", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "This report describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20131227_RS21534_fc8294c6ff8d6dde97214d05841c5f0b27fa1a14.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20131227_RS21534_fc8294c6ff8d6dde97214d05841c5f0b27fa1a14.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc267865/", "id": "RS21534_2013Sep24", "date": "2013-09-24", "retrieved": "2013-12-03T12:16:12", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "This report describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20130924_RS21534_04758d8e94b4a89b2cf81d112fcb0c3f656da334.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20130924_RS21534_04758d8e94b4a89b2cf81d112fcb0c3f656da334.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations", "name": "Foreign relations" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc812646/", "id": "RS21534_2013Jul12", "date": "2013-07-12", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20130712_RS21534_fb50f17ebd4530f374c0ec19f9e9a995e6e81da4.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20130712_RS21534_fb50f17ebd4530f374c0ec19f9e9a995e6e81da4.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc228113/", "id": "RS21534_2012Aug30", "date": "2012-08-30", "retrieved": "2013-11-05T18:07:05", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "Report that describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20120830_RS21534_83256c59254d7e90d71d42623079327cc80a504a.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20120830_RS21534_83256c59254d7e90d71d42623079327cc80a504a.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations", "name": "Foreign relations" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc815277/", "id": "RS21534_2012Jan13", "date": "2012-01-13", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20120113_RS21534_490d34e9fb29652645576fa797b1d1fb4fee186e.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20120113_RS21534_490d34e9fb29652645576fa797b1d1fb4fee186e.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc817807/", "id": "RS21534_2011Oct18", "date": "2011-10-18", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20111018_RS21534_ca474242ccc40436b19feab111edd88eaa904c05.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20111018_RS21534_ca474242ccc40436b19feab111edd88eaa904c05.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc94189/", "id": "RS21534_2011Aug26", "date": "2011-08-26", "retrieved": "2012-07-24T12:39:36", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "This report describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20110826_RS21534_b2206af748856aea0d9f86cb0c10059657a34cdf.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20110826_RS21534_b2206af748856aea0d9f86cb0c10059657a34cdf.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations", "name": "Foreign relations" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc40256/", "id": "RS21534_2011April13", "date": "2011-04-13", "retrieved": "2011-08-27T10:13:38", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "This report describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20110413_RS21534_99dff162387b5df2394abecdd599070146975e40.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20110413_RS21534_99dff162387b5df2394abecdd599070146975e40.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations", "name": "Foreign relations" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman", "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government - Oman", "name": "Politics and government - Oman" } ] }, { "source": 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agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20100120_RS21534_2dbf62d1024e0b26583dfec0bd1aeed2cd6a6b6a.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20100120_RS21534_2dbf62d1024e0b26583dfec0bd1aeed2cd6a6b6a.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government -- Oman", "name": "Politics and government -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Oman -- U.S." } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc26314/", "id": "RS21534_2009Jun29", "date": "2009-06-29", "retrieved": "2010-07-07T17:39:19", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "This report describes the relationship between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman, especially with respect to Oman's support of U.S. efforts toward peace in the Middle East, the U.S. free trade agreement with Oman, and Oman's relatively close relations with Iran, the last of which seems incongruous with the other positive aspects of Oman's relationship with the U.S.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20090629_RS21534_5017867bfaf0df986fdd7f9841e7a83cc8e71844.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20090629_RS21534_5017867bfaf0df986fdd7f9841e7a83cc8e71844.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government - Oman", "name": "Politics and government - Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman", "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S." } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc810797/", "id": "RS21534_2008Dec04", "date": "2008-12-04", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20081204_RS21534_dc06ec871fb21291e2e1e14d626e13ad7e906a7c.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20081204_RS21534_dc06ec871fb21291e2e1e14d626e13ad7e906a7c.html" } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs10588/", "id": "RS21534_2008May29", "date": "2008-05-29", "retrieved": "2008-12-11T20:31:31", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": "The Sultanate of Oman is a long-time U.S. ally in the Persian Gulf; it has allowed U.S. access to its military facilities for virtually every U.S. military operation in and around the Gulf since 1980. Partly in appreciation, the United States signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Oman on January 19, 2006; implementing legislation was signed\r\non September 26, 2006 (P.L. 109-283). Sultan Qaboos has been opening the political process slowly while managing an economy that lacks vast oil reserves. This report, prepared with the assistance of Kim Klarman, will be updated.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20080529_RS21534_a37a8d4e8ef9b86c69b787273859fccdd82ff7a3.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20080529_RS21534_a37a8d4e8ef9b86c69b787273859fccdd82ff7a3.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman", "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S." } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7321/", "id": "RS21534 2005-06-28", "date": "2005-06-28", "retrieved": "2005-09-27T14:39:30", "title": "Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20050628_RS21534_1fa5fe4fcc0ed7123bdd216b66cd8716faa93517.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20050628_RS21534_1fa5fe4fcc0ed7123bdd216b66cd8716faa93517.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations - Oman - U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman", "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Oman" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc805957/", "id": "RS21534_2004Jul08", "date": "2004-07-08", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Oman: Current Issues and U.S. Policy", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20040708_RS21534_83daf98cbb4b47a5a32c62d9599044e5f9ce0854.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20040708_RS21534_83daf98cbb4b47a5a32c62d9599044e5f9ce0854.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "Middle Eastern Affairs", "National Defense" ] }